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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of the Russian disinformation 
campaigns targeting the 2020 U.S. elections and the efforts taken by the U.S. government 
and social media companies to thwart them. To develop countermeasures for Russian 
interference activities targeting future American elections, this thesis asks the question: 
What impact did the countermeasures taken by the American social media companies and 
the U.S. government have on Russian social media influence campaigns targeting the 
2020 U.S. elections? 
 This thesis uses a framework developed by Thomas Wilhelm, a U.S. Army 
researcher, to evaluate Russian hybrid warfare, based on the principles of Andrei 
Kartapolov, a prominent Russian general. Accordingly, it is used to measure the 
qualitative impact of the Russian measures and American countermeasures during the 
2020 U.S. elections. 
 This thesis finds that the Russians shifted their tactics from 2016 to 2020. Still, 
the U.S. government and social media companies effectively impeded their influence 
campaigns primarily through information sharing and account takedowns, respectively. 
Because the Russians will continue their influence campaigns to undermine the United 
States, this thesis provides recommendations to include standardized information sharing 
and the establishment of a national coordination center. 
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This thesis uses a systematic framework to evaluate the qualitative effectiveness of 
the Russian disinformation campaigns and the countermeasures taken by the U.S. 
government and social media companies to combat the aforementioned campaigns 
targeting the 2020 U.S. elections. To develop effective countermeasures for Russian 
interference activities targeting future American elections, this thesis seeks to answer the 
following question:  What impact did the measures taken by the American social media 
companies and the U.S. government have on Russian social media influence campaigns 
targeting the 2020 U.S. elections? 
Russian operatives working under the auspices of a St. Petersburg-based 
organization, known as the Internet Research Agency (IRA), created a significant degree 
of the toxicity on social media during the 2016 U.S. elections.1  The online social media 
influence campaign perpetrated by the Internet Research Agency aimed to fan the flames 
of existing divisive rhetoric, drive a wedge between the many demographic groups in 
America, and erode confidence in democracy.2  Russia remains a committed adversary 
with influence operations continuing to this very day, posing an active threat to American 
democracy.3   
Since the end of 2016, federal agencies and private sector organizations, 
specifically the major American social media companies, have been actively helping to 
safeguard political campaigns and election infrastructure from computer intrusions through 
increased cybersecurity and other security measures. To date, most research has focused 
on quantitative and qualitative analyses of the IRA’s influence campaigns. However, this 
research has not analyzed how the Russian government perceived the effectiveness of its 
 
1 Robert Mueller, Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential 
Election (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2019), 4, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=824221. 
2 Renee DiResta et al., The Tactics & Tropes of the Internet Research Agency (New York: New 
Knowledge, 2018), 4. 
3 Miles Parks and Philip Ewing, “Foreign Interference Persists And Techniques Are Evolving, Big 
Tech Tells Hill,” National Public Radio, June 18, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/06/18/880349422/
foreign-interference-persists-and-techniques-are-evolving-big-tech-tells-hill. 
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campaigns. Furthermore, the efficacy of the U.S governmental and private sector actions 
to defend against the IRA’s influence campaigns has not been systematically analyzed.  
The objectives of this thesis are three-fold: (1) examining the Internet Research 
Agency and other Russian social media campaigns ahead of the 2020 U.S. elections to 
determine whether its tactics have shifted since 2016; (2) critically analyzing the private 
sector and U.S. government’s actions to counter the Russian influence activities; and (3) 
proposing recommendations to safeguard future U.S. elections. The first two objectives are 
assessed using an analytical framework proposed by Thomas Wilhelm, Director of the U.S. 
Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office. The results of the first two objectives, inform the 
last objective as well as a review of current literature by scholars and subject matter experts 
in different fields.   
To design a helpful framework for analyzing Russian influence operations, Thomas 
Wilhelm surveyed the published works and speeches of General Lieutenant Andrei V.  
Kartapolov. Wilhelm surmised Kartapolov was one of the key architects of current Russian 
military science and doctrine.4 Wilhelm believed the framework provided a well-rounded 
understanding of Russian martial intent and objectives about hybrid warfare from a Russian 
perspective.5 Specifically, Kartapolov advocates using asymmetric, non-violent methods 
to undermine the strengths of Russia’s opponents to achieve their strategic goals.6   
The relevant components of the Kartapolov Framework for analyzing Russian 
social media-based influence operations against the United States are: (1) spreading 
discontent in the population; (2) exerting political pressure; and (3) confusing the political 
leadership.7 This thesis uses the Kartapolov framework to conduct a qualitative evaluation 
of the Internet Research Agency’s impact and the effectiveness of social media companies 
and the U.S. government’s countermeasures. Specifically, it analyzes American actions to 
 
4 Tom Wilhelm, “A Russian Military Framework for Understanding Influence in the Competition 
Period,” Military Review (2020): 35. 
5 Wilhelm, 38. 
6 Rod Thornton, “The Russian Military’s New ‘Main Emphasis,’” RUSI Journal 162, no. 4 (2017): 
18–28, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2017.1381401. 
7 A. V. Kartapolov, “Lessons of Military Conflict, Perspectives on the Development of the Related 
Forms and Methods,” Journal of the Academy of Military Science 51, no. 2 (2015): 36. 
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determine their effectiveness for countering the three influence-related components of the 
Kartapolov Framework.  
Three main themes emerged from the 2020 U.S elections. First, the Russians 
continued their efforts to target the U.S. elections but shifted tactics to avoid detection. 
Second, the social media companies, along with news media and research organizations, 
successfully identified and disrupted the evolving Russian disinformation campaigns. 
Third, the U.S. government acted more forcefully in securing the elections, primarily 
through its information sharing with the social media companies, political organizations, 
and the American public.  
Despite the best efforts of the Russians, social media companies, news media, and 
research organizations detected, exposed, and disrupted the activities of the Internet 
Research Agency and other Russian-affiliated online groups. Although America’s private 
sector may have been caught unaware during the 2016 elections, it was on heightened alert 
ahead of 2020, with the noteworthy efforts of American news outlets and non-
governmental organizations exposing Russian disinformation activities and paving the way 
for the social media companies to shut down their social media accounts.  
The U.S. government’s response to the Russian influence campaign appeared more 
robust before the 2020 elections than in the 2016 or 2018 elections. The most important 
actions taken by the U.S. government may have been the information sharing with the 
social media companies to expose Russia’s different operations and shut down its accounts. 
In addition, the U.S. government’s information-sharing may have helped the social media 
companies secure their platforms by identifying malign Russian influence activities. The 
U.S. government’s other responses, such as economic sanctions and indictments, provided 
the American public with factual narratives of the crimes perpetrated by the Russian 
Federation.  
It took the collaborative efforts of the private sector, in the form of social media 
companies, researcher organizations, and news media, and the public sector, in the form of 
the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government, to turn back the Putin-
xviii 
sanctioned disinformation operations which were targeting the 2020 U.S. elections.8 
Ultimately, the American actions appeared effective in mitigating the Russian online 
tactics because voters were undeterred and turned out in record numbers for the election.   
The 2021 Intelligence Community’s annual threat assessment named Russia as one 
of “the most serious intelligence threats to the United States” and warned that the Russian 
government would continue its efforts to propagate dissension in the American populace.9 
Based on the evaluation of the Russian actions and the effectiveness of the American 
responses in the 2020 U.S. elections, this thesis makes recommendations for protecting 
future elections that have been drawn from experts in the U.S. government, non-
governmental organizations, and academic institutions. The three types of possible actions 
are broadly categorized as security, transparency, and resiliency measures.10 The proposed 
security measures include enhanced cybersecurity, enhanced disinformation detection, 
economic sanctions, information sharing, and the establishment of a fusion center. The 
transparency measures proposed include a public communications strategy, content 
labeling standards, updated political advertising and campaign finance laws, and 
transparent reporting. The resiliency measures suggested include improved media literacy 
 
8 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent 
U.S. Elections: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution (Washington, DC: Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, 2017), 7, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf. 
9 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2021 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2021), 11, 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2021/item/2204-2021-
annual-threat-assessment-of-the-u-s-intelligence-community. 
10 Gabriel Cederberg et al., National Counter-Information Operations Strategy (Cambridge, MA: 
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2019), 
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/national-counter-information-operations-strategy; Renée DiResta 
and Shelby Grossman, Potemkin Pages & Personas: Assessing GRU Online Operations, 2014–2019 (Palo 
Alto, CA: Stanford University, 2019), https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/publication/potemkin-think-tanks; 
Angus King and Mike Gallagher, Cybersecurity Lessons from the Pandemic, CSC White Paper #1 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission, 2020), https://www.solarium.gov/public-
communications/pandemic-white-paper; Report on Russian Active Measures (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Congress. House, 2018), https://republicans-intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
final_russia_investigation_report.pdf; Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate 
on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election. Volume 1: Russian 
Efforts against Election Infrastructure with Additional Views, Senate, 116th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Congress. Senate, 2017), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Report_Volume1.pdf. 
xix 
and critical thinking for the American public.11 Hopefully, incorporating the proposed 
measures with existing ones will help repair and strengthen the framework of American 
democracy for the 21st century. 
  
 
11 Michael McFaul, ed., Securing American Elections (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University, Cyber 
Policy Center, 2019), 8, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=827251. 
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I. RUSSIA RISES FROM THE ASHES OF THE COLD WAR 
Over the course of my career, I’ve seen a number of challenges to our 
democracy.  The Russian government’s effort to interfere in our election is 
among the most serious. 
―Robert S.  Mueller III, July 24, 2019 
 
This statement from the well-respected former FBI Director underscored the 
severity of the Russian actions to interfere with the 2016 U.S. elections.   After the end of 
the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia appeared to have faded from 
America’s collective memory as an adversary.1  This attitude abruptly changed on June 
14, 2016, when a U.S.-based cybersecurity firm named Crowdstrike announced it had 
investigated intrusions into the computer networks of the Democratic National Committee 
(DNC) by two Russian hacking groups, code-named “Fancy Bear” and “Cozy Bear.”2  
Away from the news media scrutiny, Russian operatives working under the auspices of a 
St.  Petersburg-based organization, known as the Internet Research Agency (IRA), created 
a significant portion of the toxicity on social media during the presidential campaign 
season.3  The “sweeping and sustained” online social media influence campaign 
perpetrated by the Internet Research Agency aimed to fan the flames of existing divisive 
rhetoric, drive a wedge between the many demographic groups in America, and erode 
 
1 Jon Wiener, How We Forgot the Cold War: A Historical Journey Across America (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2012), 1, https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=w_Sa-
F8DXhgC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=american+memory+of+the+cold+war&ots=kvRphYu1TG&sig=sVpOO
ZBAdl0fqcHCskio5uy7tiE#v=onepage&q=american%20memory%20of%20the%20cold%20war&f=false. 
2 Dmitri Alperovitch, “Our Work with the DNC: Setting the Record Straight,” Crowdstrike Blog 
(blog), June 5, 2020, https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-
committee/. 
3 Mueller, Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election, 
2019, 4. 
2 
confidence in democracy.4  Russia remains a committed adversary as its influence 
operations continue to this very day, posing an active threat to American democracy.5   
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
While “hack and dump” campaigns, such as the 2016 DNC attack and cyberattacks 
against election infrastructure, are broadly considered Russia influence operations, the 
Internet Research Agency’s social media influence campaign directly targeted voter 
confidence in election integrity aimed to harm democracy.6  As Philip Howard, an Oxford 
researcher, contends, a healthy democracy relies on trustworthy news media and a climate 
that allows for civil discourse and consensus-building.7  The IRA’s continued onslaught of 
fake news and amplification of inflammatory content sowed discord and confusion in the 
United States. For example, Hillary Clinton received damaging publicity during the 
campaign season in 2016 when the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian 
Armed Forces (GRU) and Wikileaks continually leaked stolen content from the 
Democratic National Committee; the IRA magnified the negative image of her through its 
dissemination of memes and other negative content on social media platforms, which in 
turn politically damaged her heading into Election Day, and may have delegitimized her 
presidency had she been elected.8  Russia understood that attacks against the elections 
 
4 DiResta et al., The Tactics & Tropes of the Internet Research Agency, 4. 
5 Parks and Ewing, “Foreign Interference Persists And Techniques Are Evolving, Big Tech Tells 
Hill.” 
6 Sarah Birch, “Perceptions of Electoral Fairness and Voter Turnout,” Comparative Political Studies 
43, no. 12 (December 1, 2010): 1601–22, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414010374021; Kellie J. Weir, 
“Safeguarding Democracy: Increasing Election Integrity through Enhanced Voter Verification” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2018), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=811383. 
7 Philip N. Howard et al., The IRA, Social Media, and Political Polarization in the United States, 
2012–2018 (Oxford, UK: University of Oxford, Computational Propaganda Research Project, 2019), 39, 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=senatedocs. 
8 Allon J. Uhlmann and Stephen McCombie, “The Russian Gambit and the U.S. Intelligence 
Community: Russia’s Use of Kompromat and Implausible Deniability to Optimize Its 2016 Information 
Campaign against the U.S. Presidential Election,” Library Trends 68, no. 4 (2020): 684, https://doi.org/
10.1353/lib.2020.0017. 
3 
struck at the heart of American democracy because this process expresses the people’s will 
and gives the U.S. government legitimacy.9 
Since the end of 2016, federal agencies and private sector organizations, 
specifically the major American social media companies, have been actively helping to 
safeguard political campaigns and election infrastructure from computer intrusions through 
increased cybersecurity and other security measures.10  To date,  most research has focused 
on quantitative and qualitative analyses of the IRA’s influence campaigns. However, this 
research has not analyzed how the Russian government itself perceived the effectiveness 
of the campaigns in achieving their goals. Furthermore, the efficacy of the aforementioned 
governmental and private sector actions to defend against the IRA’s influence campaigns 
has not been studied much in a methodical fashion. This thesis seeks to use a systematic 
framework to evaluate the qualitative effectiveness of the Russian disinformation 
campaigns and the countermeasures taken by the U.S. government and social media 
companies to combat the aforementioned campaigns targeting the 2020 U.S. elections. In 
summation, Russian influence operations’ continual assault will weaken American 
democracy over the long term if not effectively countered.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
To develop effective countermeasures for Russian interference activities targeting 
future American elections, this thesis seeks to answer the following question:  What impact 
did the countermeasures taken by the American social media companies and the U.S. 
government have on Russian social media influence campaigns targeting the 2020 U.S. 
elections? 
 
9 Gregory A. Miller et al., Critical Democracy Infrastructure:  Protecting American Elections in the 
Digital Age Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Countermeasures as a National Security Agenda, 2nd ed. (Palo 
Alto, CA: OSET Institute, 2020), 9, https://trustthevote.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/01May20_CDI-
2nd.pdf. 
10 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Protected Voices,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed 
August 5, 2020, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/foreign-influence/protected-voices; 
Facebook, “Facebook - Preventing Election Interference,” About Facebook, 2020, https://about.fb.com/
actions/preventing-election-interference/; Google Threat Analysis Group, “Google Safety & Security,” 
Google (blog), accessed May 27, 2020, https://blog.google/technology/safety-security/; Twitter, “Elections 
Integrity: We’re Focused on Serving the Public Conversation,” About Twitter, 2020, 
https://about.twitter.com/en_us/advocacy/elections-integrity.html. 
4 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review analyzes the leading scholarly and expert debates on the 
Internet Research Agency and other Russia-backed social media activities targeting the 
U.S. elections from 2014 to 2020, the countermeasures taken by American social media 
companies and the U.S. government, a framework for understanding the objectives of 
Russian hybrid warfare, and the recommendations to counter Russian influence activities 
provided by subject matter experts in a variety of fields. Russian influence campaigns, 
known as “active measures,” have been in existence since the inception of the Soviet Union 
over 100 years ago.11  Prior research in this topic drew primarily from the ranks of history, 
political science, public policy, and international studies. An extensive survey of the 
current academic literature indicates that the types of researchers drawn to the field of 
foreign influence campaigns have recently broadened due to the Internet Research 
Agency’s success in employing social media platforms to conduct influence campaigns 
targeting the 2016 U.S. elections. Presently, scholarly analyses also come from researchers 
in the fields of computer science, data analytics, and communications. This thesis attempts 
to evaluate the efficacy of the aforementioned actions to determine if finetuning or a 
wholesale change in tactics is required to counteract future Russian influence campaigns. 
The literature review will be comprised of four parts. The first part examines the 
studies of Russian online influence campaigns from 2014 to 2020. The sources for this 
topic include reports and papers by the U.S. government, think tanks, private research 
firms,  academic researchers, and news media. The second part examines the documents 
which analyze or disclose countermeasures taken by the American social media companies, 
specifically Facebook, Google, and Twitter, and the U.S. government. The sources include 
government reports and statements, academic research papers, private research firm 
reports, think tanks papers, the social media companies’ transparency reports, and news 
media reporting. The third part examines a framework for understanding the objectives of 
Russian hybrid warfare. The sources primarily include articles and research papers from 
academic and military institutions. The fourth part examines recommendations for 
 
11 Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns, Panel I:  Hearing 
before the Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate, 115th Cong., 1st sess., March 20, 2017, 10. 
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countering future Russian online influence campaigns. The sources for this topic include 
Congressional reports, think tank papers, academic research papers, and private research 
companies’ reports. The literature review has revealed an abundance of source materials 
covering the activities surrounding the 2016 and 2018 U.S. elections. At the time of this 
thesis, there have not been many scholarly works published examining Russia’s 
interference against the 2020 U.S. elections.  
1. Russian Online Influence Activities from 2014 to 2020 
Groups of investigators and scholars provide a critical review and analysis of 
Russian online influence activities and tactics vis-à-vis the 2016 U.S. election. The U.S.  
Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) issued in January 2017 encapsulated the 
Executive Branch of the U.S. government’s consensus judgment that the Russian 
Federation endeavored to erode public confidence in the U.S. elections and favor one 
presidential candidate over another.12  Since that ICA was published, an abundance of 
literature into the IRA’s 2016 to 2020 activities has been written by governmental entities, 
non-governmental organizations, and academic researchers. 
Both the U.S. government’s executive and legislative branches conducted 
investigations into the Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections, which included the 
IRA’s social media campaigns. The foundational work detailing the IRA’s actions during 
this timeframe may be the 2019 report from Robert Mueller III, the former FBI Director 
appointed by the Department of Justice as the Special Counsel to investigate Russian 
interference in the 2016 U.S. elections.13  This report resulted from approximately two 
years of work by the Special Counsel’s Office and the analysis of a multitude of evidence 
collected through legal processes and interviews.14  Mueller and his team had two main 
findings regarding the Russian influence campaign.  First, the report found that the IRA’s 
 
12 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in 
Recent U.S. Elections: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution (Washington, DC: Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence, 2017), 7, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf. 
13 Robert Mueller, Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential 
Election (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2019). 
14 Department of Justice, “Special Counsel’s Office,” Department of Justice Special Counsel’s Office, 
October 16, 2017, https://www.justice.gov/sco. 
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social media campaign aimed to sow discord in the U.S. elections but pivoted to favoring 
Donald Trump when it became apparent he would be the Republican presidential 
nominee.15  Second, Mueller’s team concluded that the hack and dump attack against the 
DNC was intended to harm Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign.16  
The intelligence committees for both houses of Congress also issued reports 
regarding Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections.  Of the two, the U.S. Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) report had bipartisan approval from the 
committee members when it was published. Its findings coincided with the Special 
Counsel’s report.17  The U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) 
report was issued by the Republican majority over the Democratic committee members’ 
dissent. The HPSCI majority and minority reports concluded that the Russians had 
interfered with the elections through the cyberattack against the DNC and the IRA’s social 
media campaigns.18  The majority report neglected to mention that these two operations 
were intended to damage the Clinton campaign and favor the Trump campaign, whereas 
the minority report highlighted the majority’s omission and suggested partisan politics 
explained the omission.19  
In August 2020, the State Department’s Global Engagement Center published a 
report, which exposed Russia’s current disinformation strategy and tactics.20  Though the 
report did not address the Russian activities targeting the 2016 U.S. elections, it described 
 
15 Mueller, Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election, 
2019, 4. 
16 Mueller, 4. 
17 Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate on Russian Active Measures, 
Campaigns, and Interference In the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 2: Russia’s Use Of Social Media With 
Additional Views, Senate, 116th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress. Senate, 2019), 4, 
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume2.pdf. 
18 Report on Russian Active Measures, 98. 
19 Report of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Russian Active Measures 
Together with Minority Views, H.Rept 115–1110 (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019), 
257, https://www.congress.gov/115/crpt/hrpt1110/CRPT-115hrpt1110.pdf. 
20 Global Engagement Center, Pillars of Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem 
(Washington, DC: Department of State, 2020), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Pillars-
of-Russia%E2%80%99s-Disinformation-and-Propaganda-Ecosystem_08-04-20.pdf. 
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Russian online influence operations, the online ecosystem that Russia was aiming to 
cultivate, and framed the IRA’s current activities as a continuation of the Russian active 
measures strategy.21  The State Department and Special Counsel’s Office reports, coupled 
with the Congressional intelligence committee reports, represented the U.S. government’s 
understanding of Russian disinformation strategy in general and the IRA’s role within the 
broader Russian influence enterprise.  
In March 2021, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) issued 
an unclassified version of the intelligence community assessment summarizing foreign 
state-sponsored threats to the 2020 U.S. elections.22  In particular, the ODNI’s report 
provided a succinct but comprehensive overview of the Russian influence campaign, which 
focused on damaging the Biden presidential campaign and favoring the Trump 
campaign.23  In April 2021, the ODNI issued an unclassified version of the Intelligence 
Community’s annual worldwide threat assessment, highlighting Russian influence 
operations as a persistent threat to the United States.24  Reporting from the ODNI 
represents the collective efforts of all 18 organizations which comprise the U.S. 
Intelligence Community.25 
Another corpus of literature written by non-governmental and academic researchers 
tended to be more quantitively detailed in its findings of the IRA than governmental 
counterparts as they delved into statistical analyses of social media activities.  Researchers 
from the New Knowledge private research firm, now known as Yonder, conducted a 
comprehensive analysis of the IRA’s activities in 2016 and authored a report at the request 
 
21 Global Engagement Center. 
22 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Intelligence Community Assessment on Foreign 
Threats to the 2020 U.S. Federal Elections,” Intelligence Community Assessment (Washington, DC, March 
16, 2021), https://www.odni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2021/item/
2192-intelligence-community-assessment-on-foreign-threats-to-the-2020-u-s-federal-elections. 
23 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2–5. 
24 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2021 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community, 11. 
25 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Members of the IC,” Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, accessed April 27, 2021, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/members-of-
the-ic. 
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of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.26  Renee DiResta and her colleagues 
conducted a highly detailed qualitative and quantitative analysis of all the social media data 
submitted to SSCI by Facebook, Google, and Twitter.  The data encompassed the IRA’s 
activities from about 2015 to 2018.  Their findings regarding the intent of the IRA’s social 
media campaign and the cyberattack against the DNC aligned with the Special Counsel’s 
and SSCI’s reports.27  DiResta et al. go beyond the government reports’ findings and 
conclude that the Russians actively attempted to suppress voter turnout, especially among 
black voters, and foment insurrectionist sentiment against different levels of American 
government.28  
Philip Howard, a University of Oxford researcher, also had the opportunity to 
analyze the aforementioned social media data provided to SSCI. Howard and his colleagues 
conducted a statistical analysis of the social media data, to include an in-depth examination 
of the IRA’s strategy and tactics.29  Howard, who along with Samuel Woolley, had 
previously coined the phrase “computational propaganda” to describe the IRA’s cyber 
covert operation activities, also found that the IRA’s social media campaign was designed 
to interfere in the 2016 U.S.  elections, specifically favoring Trump over Clinton.30  Their 
report went further than prior research by describing the specific targeting of different 
demographic groups to elicit particular responses; i.e., promoting right-wing turnout for 
Trump, discouraging black voters from voting or civic engagement, and amplifying the 
differences between the ideologically progressive and conservative.31   
 
26 DiResta et al., The Tactics & Tropes of the Internet Research Agency. 
27 DiResta et al., 4. 
28 DiResta et al., 8. 
29 Howard et al., The IRA, Social Media, and Political Polarization in the United States, 2012–2018. 
30 Samuel C. Woolley and Philip N. Howard, “Political Communication, Computational Propaganda, 
and Autonomous Agents,” National Science Foundation Public Access Repository, September 3, 2016, 6; 
Howard et al., The IRA, Social Media, and Political Polarization in the United States, 2012–2018, 3; 
Woolley and Howard, “Political Communication, Computational Propaganda, and Autonomous Agents,” 3. 
31 Howard et al., The IRA, Social Media, and Political Polarization in the United States, 2012–2018, 
18. 
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More recently, Robert Walker examined the IRA’s online activities in his 2019 
master’s thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School.32  His work’s primary focus was to 
evaluate the purpose and impact of the IRA’s social media content, coming to the same 
conclusions as his predecessors.33  Unlike the previously mentioned researchers, Walker 
also examined the countermeasures taken by private sector companies and the U.S.  
government from 2016 to 2018 to assess their impact and found them to be partially 
effective.34  These researchers did not have the same political considerations or constraints 
as governmental investigators to examine and make qualitative judgments about the intent 
of the IRA’s activities and motivations.   
Despite a broad agreement within the United States that the Russians attempted to 
interfere in the 2016 U.S. elections, some conservative American media have disputed the 
impact these efforts had on the election outcome. In a New York Magazine article, Margaret 
Hartmann, senior editor, stated, “the general consensus is that liberals are overstating the 
significance of Russia’s alleged meddling in an effort to shift the blame for their loss from 
Hillary Clinton, and undermine Trump’s presidency.”35  A 2018 poll taken by British 
marketing research firm YouGov found that only 37% of Republicans believed Russia 
interfered with the 2016 U.S. elections.36  This researcher’s extensive literature search 
could not find any scholars, private research organizations, or prominent conservative think 
tanks who had authored papers discussing the Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. 
elections, the Internet Research Agency’s social media activities, or policy 
recommendations for countermeasures.  The negative results of this query suggest that this 
topic did not rate as relevant to these organizations. 
 
32 Robert E. Walker, “Combating Strategic Weapons of Influence on Social Media” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2019), http://hdl.handle.net/10945/62826. 
33 Walker, 69–79. 
34 Walker, 89–100. 
35 Margaret Hartmann, “How Conservatives View Russia’s Alleged Meddling in the U.S. Election,” 
New York Magazine, December 16, 2016, https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2016/12/how-the-right-is-
talking-about-russias-election-meddling.html. 
36 Kathy Frankovic, “Republicans Still Not Convinced of Russian Election Meddling,” YouGov, 
August 10, 2018, https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2018/08/10/republicans-still-not-
convinced-russian-election-m. 
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2. Countermeasures by the Private Sector and the U.S. Government 
The Internet Research Agency appeared to conduct their influence activities 
undetected on the major social media platforms, specifically those belonging to Facebook, 
Google, and Twitter, before and during the 2016 U.S. elections.37  Thus, the social media 
companies did not pursue any policy changes or take any actions to thwart the influence 
campaign.  In October 2016, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence publicly blamed the Russian Federation for hacking 
the Democratic National Committee.38  Subsequently, the FBI and ODNI issued a joint 
analysis report (JAR), providing more details to the previously published joint statement.39  
The JAR attributed the 2016 DNC hack to two Russian hacking groups, known as APT28 
and APT29, and provided technical details to allow organizations to safeguard themselves 
from these types of computer intrusions.40  Typically, the U.S. government does not 
publicly disclose foreign actors’ tradecraft because it can reveal sensitive sources and 
methods used to acquire this information.  Likely, the significance of the DNC hack and 
public pressure prompted the U.S. government to supplement its initial October 2016 
statement.41  
During the time frame after the 2018 U.S. elections and before the 2020 U.S.  
elections, private research firms and academic research centers played a more prominent 
role as the social media companies decided to partner with them. These research 
 
37 Cecilia Kang, Nicholas Fandos, and Mike Isaac, “Tech Executives Are Contrite About Election 
Meddling, but Make Few Promises on Capitol Hill,” New York Times, October 31, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/31/us/politics/facebook-twitter-google-hearings-congress.html. 
38 Department of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Joint 
Statement from the Department of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence on 
Election Security (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/10/07/joint-statement-department-homeland-
security-and-office-director-national. 
39 Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation, GRIZZLY STEPPE – 
Russian Malicious Cyber Activity (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, 2016), https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-
20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf. 
40 Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation, 5–10. 
41 Chris Strohm, “Russian Hacking Began as ‘Grizzly Steppe,’” Chicago Tribune, December 30, 
2016, sec. Nation & World, https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct-russian-hack-grizzly-steppe-
20161230-story.html. 
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organizations were pivotal in identifying the Internet Research Agency’s activities and its 
various influence campaigns. The two noteworthy organizations were Graphika and the 
Stanford Internet Observatory. In 2020, Graphika issued a series of reports that exposed 
Russian influence operations’ activities across different platforms. The organization 
coordinated with the social media companies that shut down IRA-controlled accounts.  It 
discovered that the IRA had made fake left-wing and right-wing news sites to amplify the 
existing discourse on hot-button topics, such as governmental corruption, gun control, and 
racial discrimination.42  The Graphika researchers concluded that the IRA made these sites 
to help them target people through their ideologies, similar to their tactics in 2016.43  The 
Stanford Internet Observatory was led by Alex Stamos, formerly Facebook’s Chief 
Security Officer, and Renee DiResta, one of the researchers retained by SSCI to investigate 
Russian interference in 2016. The Stanford Observatory collaborated with the social media 
companies to identify Russian influence campaigns, which the companies would 
subsequently disrupt through account takedowns and content removal.44  The Stanford 
researchers identified influence operations conducted by the GRU and IRA in Africa, 
which mostly followed prior Russian influence campaign tactics.45  These two instances 
showed the social media companies partnering with different research organizations to 
identify and disrupt various foreign influence campaigns, likely to avoid duplicating efforts 
and spread the workload.   
 
42 Ben Nimmo et al., “IRA Again: Unlucky Thirteen” (New York, NY: Graphika, September 2020), 
https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphika_report_ira_again_unlucky_thirteen.pdf; Jack Stubbs, 
“Exclusive: Russian Operation Masqueraded as Right-Wing News Site to Target U.S. Voters - Sources,” 
Reuters, October 1, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-election-russia-disinformation-
idUSKBN26M5OP. 
43 Nimmo et al., “IRA Again: Unlucky Thirteen,” 24; Stubbs, “Exclusive.” 
44 DiResta and Grossman, Potemkin Pages & Personas: Assessing GRU Online Operations, 2014–
2019; Stanford Internet Observatory, “Analysis of June 2020 Twitter Takedowns Linked to China, Russia, 
and Turkey,” Stanford Internet Observatory (blog), June 11, 2020, https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/
june-2020-twitter-takedown. 
45 DiResta and Grossman, Potemkin Pages & Personas: Assessing GRU Online Operations, 2014–
2019; Shelby Grossman, Daniel Bush, and Renée DiResta, “Evidence of Russia-Linked Influence 
Operations in Africa,” Stanford Internet Observatory (blog), October 30, 2019, https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-
1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/29oct2019_sio_-_russia_linked_influence_operations_in_africa.final_.pdf. 
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3. Framework for Understanding Russian Hybrid Warfare 
The concept of Russian hybrid warfare was devised by Western experts around 
2014 to describe Russia’s use of conventional military force and unconventional means, 
specifically cyberattacks and information operations, in its incursions into Crimea, Eastern 
Ukraine, and Syria.46  A review of current literature determined that the Russian military 
officers who are believed to have contributed the most to the Russian hybrid warfare 
concept were General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian Federation’s General Staff, 
Lieutenant General S. A. Bogdanov, a retired General Staff officer, and Lieutenant General 
Andrei V. Kartapolov, currently Russia’s Deputy Minister of Defense and the former head 
of the Russian General Staff’s Main Operational Directorate.47  Of these individuals, 
Gerasimov was most widely attributed to have created modern Russian hybrid warfare 
because of a heavily cited article he wrote in February 2013 to describe his thoughts on 
21st-century wars.48  In 2014, a British researcher, Mark Galeotti, coined the term “The 
 
46 Ofer Fridman, “On the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’: Why the West Fails to Beat Russia to the Punch,” 
PRISM 8, no. 2 (2019): 101. 
47 Viorel Barbu, “The Hybrid War in the East-West Paradigm,” in Strategic Changes in Security and 
International Relations, ed. Dorin Corneliu Pleșcan et al., vol. XVI, Part 2 (16th International Scientific 
Conference, Bucharest, Romania: “Carol I” National Defence University, 2020), 101–12, 
https://www.strategii21.ro/A/2020-
04.%20STRATEGIC%20CHANGES%20IN%20SECURITY%20AND%20INTERNATIONAL%20RELA
TIONS/FSA_2020_VOLUMUL%202.pdf#page=102; Elizabeth Bodine-Baron et al., Countering Russian 
Social Media Influence (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2740; 
Sandor Fabian, “The Russian Hybrid Warfare Strategy – Neither Russian nor Strategy,” Defense & 
Security Analysis 35, no. 3 (2019): 308–25, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2019.1640424; Fridman, “On 
the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’”; Mark Galeotti, “The Mythical ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and the Language of 
Threat,” Critical Studies on Security 7, no. 2 (2019): 157–61, https://doi.org/10.1080/
21624887.2018.1441623; Krisztian Jojart, “Russia Military Thinking and the Hybrid War,” Scientific 
Periodical of the Hungarian Military National Security Service, no. 1 (2019): 82; Nina A. Kollars and 
Michael B. Petersen, “Feed the Bears, Starve the Trolls: Demystifying Russia’s Cybered Information 
Confrontation Strategy,” The Cyber Defense Review Special edition (2019): 145–60; Sarah O’Connor et al., 
Cyber-Enabled Foreign Interference in Elections and Referendums, Policy Brief Report No. 41 (Canberra, 
Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020), https://www.aspi.org.au/report/cyber-enabled-
foreign-interference-elections-and-referendums; Timothy Thomas, “The Evolution of Russian Military 
Thought: Integrating Hybrid, New-Generation, and New-Type Thinking,” Journal of Slavic Military 
Studies 29, no. 4 (2016): 554–75, https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2016.1232541; Timothy Thomas, “The 
Evolving Nature of Russia’s Way of War,” Military Review 97, no. 4 (August 2017): 34–42; Thornton, 
“The Russian Military’s New ‘Main Emphasis’”; Wilhelm, “A Russian Military Framework.” 
48 Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science in Prediction,” Military-Industrial Kurier, February 27, 
2013, https://www.ies.be/files/Gerasimov%20HW%20ENG.pdf. 
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Gerasimov Doctrine” to encapsulate this evolution in Russian military thinking.49  Over 
the next five years, the Gerasimov Doctrine was referenced or cited in hundreds of 
scholarly works.50  In 2019, Galeotti gave a mea culpa when he clarified that the term was 
meant to be a placeholder for the changing thoughts about Russian military strategy.51  
Galeotti pointed out that Gerasimov was a career armored division officer and not 
considered a military science theoretician.52   Other Russian experts also dismissed the 
Gerasimov Doctrine as a model for understanding how Russia incorporated information 
operations into its conventional warfare strategy.53   
Like Gerasimov, Lieutenant General Bogdanov and a colleague wrote an article 
about hybrid warfare called the “New Generation War.”54  In this article published in 
February 2013, Bogdanov discussed the need for information technology and information 
operations superiority, as it perceived the United States and other Western countries were 
already using technology-enabled psychological warfare to target Russia.55  Bogdanov 
believed these information operations could internally undermine a country’s ability to 
govern and leave it vulnerable to conventional military force.56   However, since the 
publication of that article, Bogdanov has not mentioned the term “New Generation War” 
in his subsequent articles.57  Later on, Bogdanov would use a different term for hybrid 
warfare, popularized by Lieutenant General Kartapolov.58 
 




53 Fridman, “On the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine,’” 101; Fabian, “The Russian Hybrid Warfare Strategy,” 
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54 S.G. Chekinov and S.A. Bogdanov, “The Nature and Content of New Generation War,” Military 
Thought, no. 4 (February 2013): 12–23. 
55 Chekinov and Bogdanov; Thomas, “The Evolving Nature of Russia’s Way of War,” 39. 
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57 Thomas, “The Evolving Nature of Russia’s Way of War,” 41. 
58 Thomas, 41. 
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In 2015, Lieutenant General Kartapolov published an article and gave a speech at 
the Russian Academy of Military Science about hybrid warfare, which he described as 
“New-Type Warfare.”59  Specifically, Kartapolov discussed using asymmetric means, 
such as cyber operations and other forms of political pressure, to weaken an adversarial 
state’s military strength.60  What differentiates Kartapolov from Gerasimov and Bogdanov 
was the specific manner in which he laid out the elements for successfully waging New-
Type Warfare.61  Multiple Western scholars consider Kartapolov’s article and speech to 
be a roadmap for the current Russian military thought and practice of hybrid warfare.62  
Figure 1 shows a graphic from the Kartapolov article, which describes the tactics for 
conducting a New-Type War. In particular, Thomas Wilhelm, an American military 
scholar, has devised a framework for understanding Russian influence operations based on 
his analyses of multiple works by General Kartapolov, which will be discussed in further 
detail in the Research Design section of this thesis.63 
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Figure 1. Kartapolov’s Components for Conducting Hybrid Warfare.64 
 
4. Recommendations for Countering Russian Influence Campaigns 
Recommendations for countering Russian malign influence operations primarily 
come from three sectors: (1) the U.S. government, (2) non-governmental organizations 
such as think tanks, and (3) researchers affiliated with academic institutions. The 
intelligence committees for both houses of Congress provided recommendations in the 
reports, which summarized their investigations of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S.  
elections. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence report’s 
recommendations focused on information sharing between election-related stakeholders, 
improved cybersecurity for election information infrastructure, and potential legislative 
actions to enhance cybersecurity.65  The Senate Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence report’s recommendations discussed the Executive Branch using a suite of 
deterrents to dissuade foreign influence in U.S. elections, such as sanctions, diplomatic 
pressure, and cyber operations, enhanced cybersecurity measures for election 
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infrastructure, and replacing outdated election equipment.66  All of these recommendations 
may broadly be characterized as security measures.   
Like the Congressional reports, various policy think tanks have proposed a series 
of recommendations to counter Russian influence campaigns. The RAND Corporation 
suggested a three-pronged set of activities: (1) targeting the Russian government through 
sanctions, diplomacy, and pro-democracy programs; (2) identifying and disrupting the 
activities of the Internet Research Agency and other proxies through information sharing 
and improved detection technologies; and (3) disrupting the effectiveness of social media 
amplification channels through technology enhancements and policy changes.67  Similar 
to the third prong of RAND’s recommendations, the German Marshall Fund was highly 
focused on improved transparency through better information-sharing between companies 
and better labeling state-sponsored content.68  Looking at the environment from a more 
holistic perspective than RAND or the German Marshall Fund, the Belfer Center advocated 
for a national strategy for countering information operations, to include increased 
transparency to attribute and reveal Russian influence operations, leveraging all facets of 
the U.S. government to disrupt these operations, increased engagement with allies to 
counter influence operations, and better cooperation between the U.S. government and 
social media companies.69  In contrast to the other organizations, the Belfer Center also 
advocated for improved media literacy in the nation’s education system.70  In summary, 
the writers’ consensus viewpoint from the literature review is that enhanced security, 
transparency, and resiliency are crucial to combating malign Russian influence in elections.   
As another group of outside observers of social media influence campaigns, 
academic researchers provided practical proposals based on their analysis of the IRA’s 
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tactics and activities.  These proposals may have added weight because they are in peer-
reviewed publications. Both DiResta and Howard’s academic research teams, from 
Stanford University and Oxford University respectively, provided wide-ranging proposals 
involving collaboration between relevant stakeholders to counter current and future 
Russian influence campaigns.71  These recommendations included information sharing 
between private sector companies and the government, better policing and content 
moderation by the social media companies, and critically thinking about how future 
technologies can influence campaigns.72   
In contrast to DiResta and Howard’s teams, researchers from the Harvard Kennedy 
School concentrated their recommendations on social media companies.73  Specifically, 
the Harvard researchers focused on policy improvements for the social media companies 
concerning increased transparency for taking down content, better content moderation, 
labeling state-sponsored content, providing links to reliable sources of information, and 
focusing on their users’ rights and privacy.74  Kate Starbird, a University of Washington 
researcher, agreed on the critical nature of better content moderation by the social media 
companies but expressed concern about the potential curtailment of free speech.75  In a 
completely different vein, Canadian researchers Barry Cartwright et al. believe advanced 
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technology, specifically artificial intelligence, will be vital for detecting and combating 
foreign influence campaigns.76   
A review of the literature revealed some trends among the different sectors, which 
provided recommendations. The Congressional recommendations focused on security 
measures such as enhanced cybersecurity, economic sanctions, and cyber operations.77  
The think tank recommendations ran the gamut from security measures similar to 
Congressional recommendations to transparency measures, such as promoting public 
communications about disinformation campaigns by the U.S. government, to resilience 
measures, such as improved media literacy.78  Academic literature generally supported the 
same security, transparency, and resiliency measures favored by think tanks and public 
policy organizations.79    
5. Conclusions from Literature Review 
A review of all the relevant literature makes clear that Russia has and will continue 
to persist as an adversarial nation-state seeking to destabilize American democracy. The 
current online influence campaigns being conducted by Russian actors are an extension of 
Soviet-era psychological warfare operations, amplified by 21st-century social media 
platforms. The sources providing recommendations to counter these malign influence 
operations include academia, private sector, government, think tanks, and other non-
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governmental organizations. The variety of sources and input indicates that a whole-of-
society approach utilizing a range of security, transparency, and resiliency measures will 
be necessary to combat Russian influence operations.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The objectives of this thesis are three-fold: (1) examining the Internet Research 
Agency and other Russian social media campaigns ahead of the 2020 U.S. elections to 
determine whether its tactics have shifted since 2016; (2) critically analyzing the private 
sector and U.S. government’s actions to counter the Russian influence activities; and (3) 
proposing recommendations to safeguard future U.S. elections. The first two objectives 
will be assessed using an analytical framework proposed by Thomas Wilhelm, Director of 
the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office.  The last objective will be informed by 
the results of the first two objectives, as well as a review of current literature by scholars 
and subject matter experts in different fields.   
To design a useful framework for analyzing Russian influence operations, Thomas 
Wilhelm surveyed the published works and speeches of General Lieutenant Andrei V.  
Kartapolov. Wilhelm surmised Kartapolov was one of the key architects of current Russian 
military science and doctrine, specifically the aforementioned “New-Type War.”80  
Wilhelm believed the framework provided a well-rounded understanding of Russian 
martial intent and objectives about hybrid warfare through a Russian perspective.81 
Specifically, Kartapolov advocates utilizing asymmetric, non-violent methods to 
undermine the strengths of Russia’s opponents to achieve their strategic goals.82  
Kartapolov highlighted ten components for conducting hybrid warfare, herein referred to 
as the Kartapolov Framework:  (1) spreading discontent in the population; (2) exerting 
political pressure; (3) confusing the political leadership; (4) use of new and advanced 
weaponry; (5) train and arm opposition forces; (6) utilization of special military forces 
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behind enemy lines; (7) commit large scale subversive acts to destabilize to the enemy; (8) 
shift to conventional warfare after softening the enemy; (9) destroy the enemy and seize 
territory concurrently; and (10) use airstrikes and artillery to destroy any focal points of 
resistance to establish complete control of the territory.83 
The relevant components of the Kartapolov Framework for analyzing Russian 
social media-based influence operations against the United States are: (1) spreading 
discontent in the population; (2) exerting political pressure; and (3) confusing the political 
leadership.84  This thesis will use the Kartapolov framework to conduct a qualitative 
evaluation of the Internet Research Agency’s impact and the effectiveness of social media 
companies and the U.S. government’s countermeasures. To assess the social media 
companies and the U.S. government’s actions to counter Russian influence activities, this 
thesis will also employ the Kartapolov framework. Specifically, the American actions will 
be analyzed to determine their effectiveness for countering the three influence-related 
components of the Kartapolov Framework. In particular, a qualitative analysis will evaluate 
American efforts to counter the spread of discontent in the American populace, defuse 
political pressure, and stop confusion in political leadership. The analysis will be dependent 
on publicly available information.     
 The review of the private sector countermeasures to the IRA’s influence campaign 
will be based on examining three sources of information. Private sector actions, specifically 
those of the “Big Three” social media companies of Facebook, Google, and Twitter, are 
tracked and reviewed by academic researchers and non-governmental organizations.85  
These two groups write reports or papers based on their findings. An example of this type 
of information is a recently published paper examining Twitter’s account suspensions 
related to the 2020 U.S. elections by researchers from the University of New Mexico and 
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the Georgia Institute of Technology.86  The social media companies have also regularly 
made public announcements of their actions to combat foreign influence activities.  These 
types of information will be used to assess the impact of the private sector’s 
countermeasures.   
The review of U.S. government countermeasures will rely only on publicly 
available, unclassified information. Although classified reporting on U.S. government 
actions likely exists, these sources will fall outside this thesis’s scope.  In certain instances, 
different facets of the U.S. Government generates unclassified reports, such as those 
produced by the different committees in Congress or various executive branch agencies.  
In other circumstances, the U.S. government will make public statements or unseal legal 
documents such as indictments or arrest affidavits.  On occasion, the news media will also 
leverage their sources to reveal U.S. government actions.  These types of information will 
be used to assess the impact of the U.S. government’s countermeasures. 
 Recommendations for safeguarding future U.S. elections will be informed by the 
aforementioned analyses of actions taken by the private sector and the U.S. government 
and a review of advice provided by subject matter experts in various fields. These experts 
comprise academic scholars, researchers from non-governmental organizations, and U.S.  
government officials from both the legislative and executive branches. The diverse 
experiences and perspectives should provide a robust set of recommendations for a whole-
of-society approach to secure elections.   
In summation, the examination of the Internet Research Agency’s social media 
campaigns ahead of the 2020 U.S. elections will rely primarily on exploring literature 
produced by four groups: academic researchers, non-governmental research organizations, 
reports from the social media companies, and U.S. government investigatory reports.  
Although offering different perspectives, these subject matter experts provide the most 
reliable analysis and assessment of the Russian influence activities. 
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II. OPENING MOVES – SCOPE AND BACKGROUND 
We’re all targets of a sophisticated and capable adversary and we must 
engage in a whole-of-government approach to combat Russian active 
measures. 
― Richard Burr, March 30, 2017 
 
In the Russian Federation, President Vladimir Putin, who has been in power since 
2000, makes every major decision.87  As a former senior-level KGB officer, Putin holds 
antagonistic views of liberal democracies in general and the United States in particular.88  
Michael McFaul, former U.S. Ambassador to Russia, assessed that Putin sees the United 
States as “a hostile power and a serious threat to Russian national interests.”89  As such, 
Putin perceives himself to be in an ideological struggle “between conservative, Christian, 
sovereign values—which he embraces—and decadent, liberal, multilateral ideas 
championed by many Western governments, including first and foremost the United 
States.”90  Harkening back to Soviet-era information operations, Putin recognized the 
advent of online social media platforms as an avenue to target U.S. elections.91  The 
Russian influence operations started before the 2016 U.S. elections and continued through 
the 2020 U.S. elections.  
Before delving into the nuances of the Russian online social influence campaigns 
targeting the 2020 U.S. elections, this chapter outlines the scope of the issue to be studied 
in this thesis, the recent history motivating these influence campaigns, a review of Russian 
and American measures during the 2016 and 2018 U.S. elections, and an analysis of the 
effectiveness of these measures using the Kartapolov Framework.  
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A. SCOPE OF THESIS 
The current Russian information operations targeting U.S. elections can trace their 
roots to Soviet-era propaganda and disinformation campaigns.92  Because of the immense 
longevity and scale of these Russian information operations, it is essential to frame what 
will be discussed within the confines of this thesis. The critical components to be bounded 
are time periods covered, types of influence operations, and the social media platforms to 
be examined.  
1.      Relevant Time Periods 
On March 30, 2017, Eugene Rumer, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and 
described active measures as a century-old suite of information warfare tools continuously 
being used by Russia to advance its ideological objectives and erode the stability of its 
liberal democratic rivals.93  The use of disinformation campaigns, i.e., intentionally 
propagating false or misleading information, is one of the primary tools in their portfolio.94  
Soviet-era active measures evolved and are now “enabled by technology and adapted for a 
globalized world, their modern incarnations are much more sinister, with far greater range 
and speed – and, through the Internet, able to influence popular opinion on a scale never 
before possible.”95  However, it was only around the 2016 U.S. elections when the 
Russians deployed these large-scale online disinformation campaigns against the American 
democratic system.96  Therefore, this thesis will focus on Russian activities from three 
distinct periods: (1) preceding and during the 2016 U.S. elections, (2) after the 2016 U.S. 
elections to preceding the 2018 U.S. midterm elections, and (3) after the 2018 U.S. midterm 
elections to the 2020 U.S. elections.  
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2. Types Of Russian Influence Operations 
The Russian influence operations directed at the 2016 U.S. Presidential elections 
are broadly divided into three categories, the last of which will be within the scope of this 
thesis.97  The first category is “hack and dump,” wherein Russian hackers breached the 
DNC computer networks, stole data, and then disseminated it via different online platforms 
such as WordPress, Twitter, and Wikileaks.98  The second category is attempted hacks on 
the actual voting systems in each state. The systems include voter registration databases 
and online polling equipment. The last category, as described by researchers from New 
Knowledge, is the “sweeping and sustained” online social media influence campaign 
perpetrated by the Internet Research Agency “consisting of various coordinated 
disinformation tactics aimed directly at U.S. citizens, designed to exert political influence 
and exacerbate social divisions in U.S. culture.”99  
Online social media influence campaigns conducted by the Internet Research 
Agency and other Russian-backed organizations will be the focus of this thesis because 
they have a significant and continuing impact on Americans and democracy. In contrast, 
the other two types of Russian influence operations, focused on political campaigns and 
election infrastructure, are only germane to Americans every two years during election 
seasons. Since the 2016 election, federal agencies and private sector organizations have 
been actively helping to safeguard political campaigns and election infrastructure from 
computer intrusions through increased cybersecurity and other security measures. 
Arguably, campaigns and election systems are better protected now than they were in 2016. 
Though regularly occurring on a biennial basis, American engagement with the electoral 
process is little compared to their daily, and sometimes hourly, social media engagement.   
In 2019, about 70 percent of all Americans had at least one social media account 
and used the Internet between 30 minutes to two hours per day.100  This statistic means the 
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IRA has daily opportunities to reach out to Americans via social media newsfeeds or posts. 
Due to First Amendment constraints, federal agencies have little involvement in 
Americans’ usage of social media. Couple this with the fact that social media companies 
have a vested interest in keeping American users on their platforms. For the most part, 
Americans are left to fend for themselves on social media platforms.   
Research has shown mixed results regarding people’s usage of social media. On the 
one hand, social media usage positively correlates with increased political engagement.101  
On the other hand, users tend to stay on social media platforms longer when engaged with 
content that conforms to their own opinions, whether factual or not.102  The social media 
companies understand this phenomenon and finetune their algorithms to keep feeding 
content they think users want.103  The IRA could take advantage of this behavior by 
inserting itself into the social media ecosystem and working to sow discord and erode the 
American public’s trust in democratic institutions.   
3. Targeted Social Media Platforms 
Despite a vast array of social media platforms, Russians primarily targeted these 
three of the four most visited ones: #1 – YouTube, a Google subsidiary, #3 – Twitter, and 
#4 - Facebook.104  Wikipedia is the #2 most visited website, but not a social media platform 
and heavily moderated, unlike the other sites.105  Whereas previous studies focused on 
discrete periods around a single election (2016, 2018, or 2020), this thesis will review and 
analyze Russian activities across the entire time when the IRA and other Russian-backed 
groups have targeted the United States with its social media influence campaigns. The term, 
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private sector companies, will refer to the three companies whose social media platforms 
were the most heavily used by the Russians for their influence operations. Understanding 
the IRA’s activities across this period may reveal the efficacy of actions taken by the 
private sector companies and the U.S. government in response to the IRA’s efforts.  
B. RECENT HISTORY – THE CAMPAIGNS FROM 2016 TO 2018 
Around 2014, Putin tapped his close ally Yevgeniy Prigozhin to conduct influence 
operations against the American public.106  Prigozhin, recognized as “Putin’s Chef,” is a 
Russian oligarch who owns a conglomerate known as Concord Management, with 
subsidiaries in various businesses, including catering.107  Project Lakhta is the umbrella 
term for Prigozhin-owned firms focused on domestic and overseas influence operations. 
By September 2016, the monthly operating budget of Project Lakhta was the equivalent of 
$1.25 million.108  One of the businesses under Project Lakhta is the Internet Research 
Agency, founded around 2013 in St. Petersburg, Russia, to be a sophisticated marketing 
and influence firm. Organized like a legitimate business, its management group oversees 
various departments, including finance, information technology, search engine 
optimization, data analysis, and graphics.109  Before targeting Americans, IRA employees 
engaged in around-the-clock influence operations directed at Russian and Ukrainian 
citizens.110  In April 2014, a new department called the “Translator Project” was formed 
to conduct online activities against Americans on the American social media platforms of 
Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube.111  By July 2016, IRA assigned more than 
80 employees to the Translator Project.112  These machinations showed the Russian 
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Federation’s commitment of personnel and resources to pursue this type of covert online 
campaigning. 
President Putin’s initial strategy appeared to be inflaming the existing discord in 
the American populace and eroding public confidence in American institutions such as free 
speech and the electoral process. Still, that strategy evolved as it became clear who the 
nominees would be. By June 2016, Hillary Clinton was the presumptive Democratic 
nominee and frontrunner for president. Putin was known to despise Clinton during her 
tenure as Secretary of State during the Obama Administration.113  She seemed to be the 
ideological opposite of Putin. Clinton believed in multilateral international cooperation, 
wanted to strengthen NATO, desired increased sanctions for Russia’s occupation of 
Crimea, and advocated for fair elections and greater freedoms within Russia.114  Putin may 
have sensed that Donald Trump’s rise as a legitimate candidate offered an avenue to 
advance his anti-American agenda. Putin’s strategy evolved as the presidential campaign 
season continued through the summer, supporting Trump as its centerpiece.115  The 
Russian covert influence operation pivoted to helping the Trump campaign, in addition to 
its continued efforts to tear down the Clinton campaign.116  An IRA-purchased political 
advertisement on Facebook reflected its efforts to target Clinton in Figure 2. This behavior 
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Figure 2. Facebook Political Advertisement Targeting Hillary Clinton.117 
 
1. What Happened During the 2016 U.S. Elections? 
 The Russian influence campaigns utilizing American social media 
platforms started around 2013 and extended through the 2016 U.S. elections.118  
Reviewing the Russian measures and the countermeasures taken by the private sector 
companies and the U.S. government during this time sets up the baseline for comparison 
to the Russian and American activities during the 2020 U.S. elections. Moreover, 
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examining these actions across three separate elections may reveal trends and evolutions 
in tactics by the Russians and Americans.  
a. The IRA’s Social Media Activities 
Before the 2016 U.S. Elections, the Internet Research Agency’s influence 
operations against the American public encompassed three lines of effort. First, IRA 
employees made and maintained fake user accounts and pages on social media platforms 
that covered a range of political issues.119  For these accounts and pages, the IRA 
employees generated organic content to ingratiate themselves with online communities and 
amplify or steer the themes discussed in these communities. Second, IRA employees used 
social media bots, i.e., computer programs which control social media accounts, to amplify 
existing content.120  Third, IRA employees covertly purchased online advertisements from 
social media companies to enhance their organic content and drive online traffic to sites 
controlled by them.121  In the marketing world, advertisements are known as “paid 
content.”  In contrast, organic content refers to unpaid messaging generated by people that 
helped foster support for a product or brand through voluntary and spontaneous 
recommendations by users.122  Although the IRA employees were being paid, they 
impersonated regular users on the social media platforms so their messaging could look 
authentic. Ironically, Russians masqueraded as Americans and weaponized free speech to 
foment division and corrode Americans’ faith in such speech.  
For the first line of effort, the IRA managed its influence operations like a digital 
marketing campaign.123  It created false personas and imitated activist groups on the left 
and right sides of the political spectrum. These personas and groups extended across 
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multiple social media platforms.124  Philip Howard, University of Oxford researcher, 
opined that “users were more likely to assume the credibility of the false organizations set 
up by the IRA with a presence across multiple platforms, operating websites, YouTube 
channels, Facebook pages, Twitter accounts, and even PayPal accounts set up to receive 
donations.”125  Viewers believed these were legitimate because of the extraordinary efforts 
the personas and groups had taken. To finetune its messaging, IRA employees visited the 
United States in 2014 to learn about American culture, gather intelligence, and take 
photographs later used to enhance the authenticity of their false online personas.126  The 
care the IRA took showed its deep commitment and calculation in its endeavors to harness 
American-style free speech to undermine trust in democracy.  
When reviewing the IRA-generated Facebook content, some themes emerge. First, 
on the left end of the political spectrum, the IRA’s efforts targeted minority groups to 
suppress voter turnout.127  Topics of messaging included anti-government rhetoric, 
boycotting the election, following the wrong voting procedures, and scaring voters from 
showing up at polling locations.128  Figure 3 illustrates an example of IRA-purchased 
political advertisements on Facebook with anti-government messaging targeting black 
voters. Second, on the right end of the political spectrum, the IRA promoted conspiracy 
theories, stopping legal and illegal immigration, protecting gun rights and religious 
freedom, and other relevant issues for conservatives (see Figure 4).129  Again, the efforts 
were presumably targeting conservatives to drive up voter turnout.  
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Figure 3. Facebook Political Ads Targeting Black voters.130 
  
 
Figure 4. Facebook Political Ads Targeting Right-Wing Voters.131 
  
 
The ratios of IRA-generated content on Facebook changed through the course of 
2016. In the first half of 2016, over half of all the most active IRA-made Facebook accounts 
targeted right-wing audiences with posts discussing the topics referenced above.132  This 
phenomenon happened before Trump had won the Republican presidential nomination. 
Explicit mentions of Trump increased by mid-2016 after he secured the nomination and 
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focused on amplifying the anti-immigrant rhetoric, which was a hallmark of the Trump 
campaign.133  Howard summed up his analysis by stating it was “clear that the IRA sought 
to energize conservatives around Trump’s campaign and encourage the cynicism of other 
voters in an attempt to neutralize their vote.”134  Howard’s examination concluded that the 
Russians sought to elicit specific behavior, namely encouraging right-wing voters to turn 
out for Trump and discouraging left-wing and minority voters from going to the polls.135    
A review of Twitter activities in 2016 showed similar behavior to the IRA’s 
activities on Facebook.136  In further support of the idea that the IRA treated its influence 
operations as a marketing campaign, Josephine Lukito, a University of Wisconsin 
researcher, observed the IRA posting messages on Reddit before similar messages 
appeared on Twitter.137  Lukito assessed that the IRA could have been using Reddit to test 
message resonance before deployment to Twitter.138  From July 2, 2015 to May 31, 2017, 
there were about 1.9 million tweets but only 12,603 Reddit posts.139  Lukita noted that 
“Twitter’s centrality to the IRA’s campaign may also explain why more content was 
produced on Twitter relative to Reddit.”140  Lukita suggested that Reddit’s usage may have 
been a “trial balloon”  and opined it could be evidence of the IRA treating their social 
media influence operation like a marketing campaign.141  One of the campaign’s central 
goals appeared to be influencing voter turnout during the elections, which was similar to 
what Philip Howard had concluded.142   
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In contrast to the IRA activities on Facebook and Twitter, the YouTube videos 
provided by Google to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence revealed that most of 
them were used to target African Americans.143  It is unclear why the IRA chose this 
platform to target African Americans specifically. However, because Google provided only 
a limited amount of data for public research, making any general conclusions regarding 
IRA activities on Google’s platforms is difficult.144  YouTube is the most visited site in 
the United States, mainly used for broadcasting videos.145  It does not facilitate two-way 
communications as quickly as the other two platforms.146  As on the other two platforms, 
the Senate Intelligence Committee assessed the intent of the YouTube videos might have 
been to suppress black voter turnout since the YouTube videos were primarily targeted at 
African Americans.147 
The sheer magnitude of the IRA’s social media campaign targeting the United 
States was unparalleled in the digital age. Researchers retained by the SSCI estimated the 
IRA had uploaded over 1,000 videos on YouTube and reached a significant number of 
American users: 59 percent on Facebook, 19 percent on Instagram, and two percent on 
Twitter.148  In table 1, the Special Counsel’s Office estimated the number of people 
reached by a Facebook posting or a Twitter tweet. Although the ultimate number of 
individual American voters influenced by the IRA remains unclear, table 1 reveals the scale 
of the reach by the social media platforms. 
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Table 1. Reach of IRA-controlled Social Media Accounts149 
Social Media Platform Number of Accounts Number of Users Reached 
Facebook 470 126,000,000 
Twitter 3,814 1,400,000 
 
For the second line of effort, the IRA amplified real user accounts whose identities, 
behavior, and content aligned with the IRA’s strategic goals.150  Clemson University 
researchers discovered over 100,000 real user accounts amplified by IRA-controlled social 
media bots.151  They noted the IRA-targeted accounts with fewer followers for 
amplification and speculated these types of accounts would generate less scrutiny from the 
social media companies or perhaps wanted to increase these accounts’ prominence to serve 
their ends. Immediately before and after the 2016 U.S. elections, the IRA changed from 
generating its own original content to amplifying real users’ messages. The IRA may have 
presumed that real users’ posts would be more impactful and resonant with American 
viewers.152  This shift showed the IRA’s continued evolution to maximize its 
effectiveness.  
For the third line of effort, the IRA purchased online advertisements from the social 
media companies to complement its other activities.153  In 2016, the IRA spent about 
$100,000 on Facebook and $5,000 on Google.154  Twitter noted that the Kremlin-
controlled media site, Russia Today, spent about $274,000 in online advertisements to 
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promote over 1,800 tweets on its platform.155  The IRA was very tactical in its advertising 
campaign. Using “race, ethnicity, and self-identity” as categories allowed it to use 
Facebook and Instagram to target specific demographic groups.156  Then, it would run 
advertising targeting each of these demographic groups to drive users to IRA-created social 
media content.157  The IRA employed different tactics for the purchase of Google online 
advertisements. In this case, Google ads guided users to various IRA-controlled websites 
and domains.158  Marketing research indicates organic content has more resonance than 
paid content (i.e., advertisements).159  Since the IRA’s online advertising campaign 
primarily drove users to the organic content, evaluating its success is difficult. The Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence concluded that the advertisements were not a vital 
component of the IRA’s campaign.160  However, the IRA used different techniques to 
further its social media influence operation, showing flexibility and adaptability.  
b. Private Sector Countermeasures 
In broad terms, organizations may take three categories of actions to counter 
influence operations:  security, transparency, and resiliency. Security measures involve the 
monitoring, detection, and neutralization of threats. Transparency measures comprise 
information sharing to relevant stakeholders, whether between organizations, organizations 
and individuals, or the general public. Transparency measures also promote trust by 
allowing people to see what is going on. Finally, resiliency measures involve taking steps 
to be able to recover quickly from adverse situations.   
During and immediately after the 2016 U.S. elections, the Big Three social media 
companies of Facebook, Google, and Twitter were utterly unaware of the IRA’s massive 
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influence campaign across all of their platforms.161  The social media companies had no 
countermeasures in place to mitigate or disrupt the IRA’s activities. Even if they had been 
aware, whether the social media companies would have taken any serious actions cannot 
be known for sure. Comments from Mark Zuckerberg, Founder and Chief Executive 
Officer of Facebook, on November 11, 2016, exemplified the companies’ mindset when 
he famously said the notion that fake news would have any impact on the presidential 
elections was “a pretty crazy idea.”162  The social media companies took no security, 
transparency, or resilience measures. Ultimately, they offered no resistance to the IRA’s 
malign activities during the 2016 U.S. elections.  
c. U.S. Government Countermeasures 
The private sector and U.S. government’s efforts were disconnected ahead of the 
2106 elections. Although U.S. government agencies, such as the FBI, monitored Russian 
influence operations, none of their acquired intelligence was relayed to the social media 
companies to protect their platforms.163 Ambassador McFaul noted that cooperation 
between the technology companies and the U.S. government was “almost non-existent” 
before the 2016 U.S. Elections in the post-Snowden leak era.164  This condition showed 
an almost complete lack of transparency between the two entities.   
The U.S. government’s attempts at security or transparency measures did not come 
until late into the presidential campaign season. The first official statement regarding the 
2016 elections from the U.S. government came on October 7, 2016, when the Department 
of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a one-page 
joint statement attributing the hack of the DNC and multiple hacking attempts against state 
election infrastructure to the Russian Federation.165  However, the statement provided no 
technical details and only general cybersecurity guidance. The joint statement’s intended 
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effect may have been to inform the American electorate of malign actions being taken by 
Russia. Though such an effect was probably diminished because on the same day, the 
media was focused on the breaking news that Donald Trump had made lewd comments 
about women to Entertainment Tonight reporter Billy Bush in 2005 when the Washington 
Post released a video of their conversation.166   
The second set of transparency and security-related actions from the U.S. 
government came on December 29, 2016, which was well after the elections. As an act of 
transparency, the FBI and DHS issued a joint action report titled “GRIZZLY STEPPE—
Russian Malicious Cyber Activity.”  The report provided an overview of the Russian 
hacking activities ahead of the election and shared technical details.167  If the U.S. 
government had provided this information ahead of the elections, especially the technical 
details, it could have helped political organizations and campaigns safeguard their 
computer networks and electronic devices. As another security and transparency action by 
the U.S. government, the Department of the Treasury publicly sanctioned nine Russians 
and two Russian intelligence agencies, the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the General 
Military Intelligence Directorate, for election-related cybercrimes.168  It also sanctioned 
two Russian hackers for financial cybercrimes under the same executive order (E.O. 
13694).169  The purpose of these sanctions was to expose the American public to all of the 
Russian activities directed against the U.S. elections. Other sanctions such as those 
imposed by the Magnitsky Act have illuminated Russian oligarchs’ and bureaucrats’ 
corrupt financial dealings while relinquishing their ill-gotten funds.170 Although these 
actions showed a proportional response from the U.S. government, the effect of such 
 
166 THR Staff, “Donald Trump Caught on Hot Mic in 2005 Talking About Women: ‘When You’re a 
Star, They Let You Do It,’” News, Hollywood Reporter, October 7, 2016, 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/donald-trump-caught-hot-mic-936343. 
167 Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation, GRIZZLY STEPPE – 
Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. 
168 Dianne E. Rennack, U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview, CRS Report No. IF10779 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=813693. 
169 Rennack. 
170 Julia Ioffe, “Why Does the Kremlin Care So Much about the Magnitsky Act?,” The Atlantic, July 
27, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/magnitsky-act-kremlin/535044/. 
39 
actions as a deterrent for future Russian meddling in U.S. elections remains indeterminate. 
U.S. economic sanctions imposed after the annexation of Crimea did not deter Russia from 
its occupation of certain parts of Eastern Ukraine but may have curtailed further 
encroachment into Ukraine.171 
During this period, the last transparency action from the U.S. government came on 
January 6, 2017, when the ODNI issued a supplemental report to the previously published 
GRIZZLY STEPPE report. This report aimed to lay out the U.S. government’s analytical 
process and provide additional details justifying the attribution of election interference to 
the Russian Federation.172  Unfortunately, whether this belated disclosure meaningfully 
affected public discourse or Americans’ understanding of the activities surrounding the 
2016 U.S. Elections is nebulous at best.  
d. Using the Kartapolov Framework to Evaluate Russian & American 
Measures in 2016 
As mentioned in the Research Design section, Thomas Wilhelm, Director of the 
U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office, developed a framework to understand how 
asymmetric techniques fit within the Russian philosophy of warfare to achieve its goals. 
This framework was inspired by Wilhem’s analysis of the writings and speeches of Russian 
Deputy Minister of Defense, Andrei V. Kartapolov.173  Using the Kartapolov Framework 
offers an organized structure to evaluate the effectiveness of the Russian measures and 
American countermeasures. As a reminder, the relevant elements of the Kartapolov 
Framework for analyzing Russian social media-based influence operations against the 
United States are: (1) spreading discontent in the population; (2) exerting political pressure; 
and (3) confusing the political leadership.174  These elements will be used to gauge the 
effectiveness of the Russian measures targeting the 2016 elections. In addition, the 
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American countermeasures will be assessed in terms of their effectiveness in mitigating 
the aforementioned elements.   
The critical elements of the Kartapolov Framework can easily be superimposed on 
the 2016 activities of the IRA’s campaign in a step-by-step fashion.175  The first element, 
spreading discontent in the population, described the IRA’s precise method of targeting 
different demographic groups with fake content, amplifying actual user content, and 
purchasing advertising. Researchers concluded that IRA’s tailored messaging aimed to 
motivate conservatives to vote while suppressing liberals, specifically black voters.176  A 
record number of Americans voted in 2016, but Black voter turnout dropped from its 2012 
levels.177  Table 2 below illustrates the decreased Black voter turnout levels. The Pew 
Research Center said voter turnout percentages among the other racial demographics 
stayed about the same.178   
Table 2. Comparison of Black Voter Turnout for Presidential Elections.179 





A direct correlation between the IRA’s activities and lower Black voter turnout 
cannot be determined within the scope of this thesis. American voters’ motivations to vote 
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or not vote are myriad and not always easy to discern. Chryl Laird, Bowdoin College 
professor, suggested that Black voter turnout fell in 2016 because the Black community 
did not have the same incentives to vote as they did in 2008 and 2012 when there was a 
Black candidate for president.180  It is still unclear whether the IRA’s operation contributed 
to the record number of Americans voting or suppressing turnout among Black voters in 
2016. What is clear is that the IRA deliberately intended to influence American voters’ 
behavior regarding the elections and possibly eroded their faith in the electoral process. 
For the second element of the framework, exerting political pressure, the IRA’s 
efforts seemed to impact the U.S. government as its responses appeared delayed and muted. 
After the Senate Intelligence Committee issued its report reviewing the response of the 
Obama Administration to the Russian interference, Senator Richard Burr commented that 
they were “frozen by ‘paralysis of analysis,’ hamstrung by constraints both real and 
perceived; Obama officials debated courses of action without truly taking one.”181  In this 
report, the Senate Intelligence Committee noted that the FBI and DHS did not provide the 
general public or state and county election officials with notifications about the malicious 
cyber activities until the late summer of 2016.182  Because the activities were not attributed 
to Russia, these notifications would not have drawn much scrutiny.183  The third element 
of the framework, confusing political leadership, appeared in one of the SSCI report 
findings, which noted that government officials were conflicted about making public 
announcements for fear of feeding the political narratives about insecure or fraudulent 
elections.184 
The social media companies were utterly caught by surprise and had no awareness 
of the malign Russian influence activities on their platforms. As such, they did not take any 
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action against the Internet Research Agency’s influence campaign in 2016. Instead, these 
companies allowed the IRA free rein to achieve the relevant elements of the Kartapolov 
Framework. However, later on, intense pressure from U.S. lawmakers and the media would 
eventually force the social media companies to examine what had taken place on their 
platforms and strive to ensure it did not happen in the future.185 
Reviewing the U.S. government’s countermeasures through the Kartapolov 
Framework revealed its ineffectiveness to counter the Internet Research Agency’s efforts. 
For the first element of the framework, the IRA had an unfettered ability to conduct 
information operations on social media and spread discontent throughout the American 
population. Not until October 2016 did the U.S. government take any action. However, the 
one-page statement from DHS and the ODNI attributing election interference to Russia did 
not make an impression with Americans as news media reporting on the tawdry revelations 
of the Trump discussion on the Entertainment Tonight video and the hacked emails from 
John Podesta likely overwhelmed all other news coverage.186  
For the second element, the Russian activities appeared to exert tremendous 
political pressure on the Obama White House. Multiple news media outlets reported that 
in the summer of 2016, President Obama was reluctant to take explicit actions because he 
did not want to appear to be influencing the election in favor of Clinton.187  By the same 
token, the third element involved confusing the political leadership. Whether the IRA’s 
tactics perplexed the Obama administration is moot because the delayed governmental 
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response represented the result that the Russians would have desired. The U.S. 
government’s actions in the form of the FBI/DHS joint report detailing Russian activities 
and the Treasury Department’s economic sanctions did not come until well after the 
elections had already been decided. The U.S. Intelligence Community assessed that Putin 
and Russia perceived their ability to shape the American discourse and influence the 
outcome of the 2016 U.S. Elections to be at least a “qualified success” and that there would 
be little negative impact to continuing their online operations.188   
Evaluating the Russian and American efforts using the Kartapolov Framework for 
this period revealed that Russia was the ultimate winner of the 2016 U.S. elections. The 
IRA’s social media campaign had fulfilled the Kartapolov Framework’s core tenets of 
spreading discontent in the population, exerting political pressure, and confusing political 
leadership.189  The American efforts ranged from non-existent, in the case of the social 
media companies, to ineffective, in the case of the U.S. government.  
2. What Happened During the 2018 U.S. Midterm Elections? 
After the 2016 U.S. Elections, the Internet Research Agency’s online operations 
continued unabated through the 2018 U.S. Elections.190  Analyzing the IRA’s activities 
and the countermeasures taken by the private sector companies and the U.S. government 
revealed how their tactics have evolved. The effectiveness of the Russian and American 
measures was evaluated using the Kartapolov Framework.  
a. The IRA’s Social Media Activities 
Despite being outed by the media and the U.S. government in late 2016, the IRA 
appeared to operate without interruption at almost the same levels in 2017 and 2018. This 
success indicated that the IRA continued to be a well-financed organization and a 
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seemingly worthwhile investment for Yevgeniy Prigozhin, Putin’s close ally.191  The 
IRA’s financial strength is shown in Table 3. Given the power structure in Russia, Putin 
likely knew of and approved of these activities.192  From his perspective, Putin had won 
the battle of 2016 and wanted to continue the social media campaign as part of the 
ideological struggle between Russia and the United States.193   
Table 3. IRA Spending Plan for 2017 and 2018.194 
Year Budget 
2017 $12,000,000 
2018 $10,000,000 (January through June) 
 
Oxford researcher Philip Howard observed the IRA taking advantage of prominent 
events by timing its online advertising purchases to coincide with events such as the 
announcement of the Trump tax plan and U.S. military strikes in Afghanistan and Syria.195  
This development may suggest the IRA had honed its skills to cater to the users it engaged. 
A second reason could be that the IRA shifted much of its social media activities from 
Facebook to Instagram. Because Instagram is more image-focused, it could be more 
conducive to the meme operations which the IRA appeared to favor. In addition, Instagram 
recognized the importance of meme campaigns and hired a manager focused solely on the 
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meme community.196  Lastly, DiResta stated that groups of low-paid workers, known as 
click farms, could have been used by the IRA to fraudulently make their Instagram 
accounts more prominent than they otherwise would have been through organic user 
engagement.197 
An analysis of the IRA’s Twitter activities from 2014 to 2018 uncovered the 
sophistication used to target distinct online communities. Specifically, the IRA targeted 
people from different demographic groups based on their political issues of interest198 
Approximately half of all the tweets from the IRA-controlled accounts happened in 
2017.199 This targeted approach indicated a certain mastery of the platform and seemed to 
be focused on fomenting dissension among the different groups identified by the IRA.  
The IRA continued using online advertising through 2017 before social media 
companies adjusted their ad purchasing policies, effectively shutting them out.200  Thus, 
at least through 2017, the IRA’s tactics appeared to be relatively unchanged. Ostensibly, 
the IRA’s continued social media activities on these platforms were meant to set the stage 
for influencing voter opinions and turnout ahead of the 2018 U.S. Midterm Elections and 
beyond.  
b. Private Sector Countermeasures 
Before the 2018 U.S. Midterm Elections, Facebook, Google, and Twitter 
announced they had taken substantive actions and policy changes to address malign foreign 
influence and election integrity issues on their platforms.201  These actions seemed to be 
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focused on security and transparency measures. Facebook and Twitter appeared to be the 
most detailed in sharing their changes and the most public about account takedowns. A 
possible reason could be that Facebook and Twitter faced more Congressional scrutiny 
than Google as their senior executives testified before Congress on three separate occasions 
before the midterm elections.202  In one of the hearings, Google was also in attendance but 
appeared more circumspect about account takedown notifications because it did not 
observe as many IRA-controlled accounts on YouTube.203  In fact, Google only announced 
the takedown of one IRA-controlled YouTube account ahead of the 2018 midterm 
elections.204   
Facebook stated it took a series of measures to protect its platform: (1) “better 
collaboration with governmental, non-governmental, and technology companies to identify 
and disrupt new threats; (2) hiring fact-checking organizations to review content and; (3) 
improved technological methods for detecting fake accounts.”205  Facebook also changed 
its advertising purchasing policies to make the buyers transparent and maintains a library 
of purchased political advertisements. Most notably, Facebook began to publicize its 
detection and takedowns of fake accounts and pages. In 2018, Facebook announced three 
takedowns totaling 597 Facebook pages, 287 Facebook accounts, and 99 Instagram 
accounts.206  Thus, whether bowing to political pressure or genuinely wanting to reform, 
Facebook appeared to take tangible actions to combat foreign influence campaigns.  
Google and Twitter also took countermeasures ahead of the 2018 U.S. midterm 
elections. For example, Google announced improved cybersecurity measures to protect 
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political campaigns and their platforms.207  During the same year, Twitter indicated its 
efforts included improving its algorithms to detect and takedown social media bots, 
establishing an internal cross-functional team to handle foreign influence threats, 
modifying its advertising policies to promote buyer transparency, updating its terms of 
service to ban all inauthentic behavior, and enhancing the security configuration settings 
for the application programming interface.208  In addition, Twitter highlighted its 
intelligence sharing with Jigsaw, Google, other social media companies, and law 
enforcement agencies.209  In October 2018, Twitter released an archive of foreign-
influence-related account information so “members of the public, governments, and 
researchers can investigate, learn, and build media literacy capacities for the future.”210  In 
2018, Twitter announced the takedown of 3,613 IRA-associated accounts. 
On the one hand, Google’s response to the Russian influence campaigns appeared 
to be subdued, likely because YouTube had not played a significant role in the IRA’s 
playbook for 2016. For example, Howard noted that Google only provided 228 YouTube 
2016 election-related videos to the Senate Intelligence Committee, and each video was 
viewed about 1,500 times or less.211  On the other hand, Twitter’s response was similar to 
Facebook’s and made substantive efforts to combat malign foreign influence on its 
platform. As a result, the number of accounts taken down by Facebook and Twitter in 2018 
was roughly commensurate with the number of accounts discovered after the 2016 U.S. 
elections. The reason for this disparity in the number of IRA accounts on each platform is 
indeterminate.  
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c. U.S. Government Countermeasures 
Before the 2018 U.S. midterm elections, the U.S. government took a series of public 
actions to address Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. elections and put countermeasures 
in place to ensure better protection in subsequent elections. These actions comprised both 
transparency and security measures. Transparency-focused efforts aimed to inform the 
American electorate about what happened in 2016 and was still occurring. Jennifer 
Hochschild, a Harvard College professor, believed “democracies thrive best…if citizens 
have a broad education and some level of political knowledge.”212  Americans should have 
access to information that is free of corrupt foreign influence to inform their voting. The 
security-focused actions were intended to deter and punish Russian interference in the U.S. 
electoral process or safeguard their intended targets. These actions took the form of 
Congressional hearings, an FBI initiative, multiple indictments, economic sanctions, and 
other operations. Unlike in the lead-up to the 2016 U.S. elections, the U.S. government was 
very active and public in enacting countermeasures before the 2018 U.S. midterm elections. 
These actions are described below in chronological order. 
On August 31, 2017, the State Department announced the closures of the Russian 
Consulate in San Francisco and annexes in New York City and Washington, D.C.213  These 
closures were taken in response to Russia reducing the size of the American workforce at 
the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, which was perceived as a retaliatory measure for the United 
States sanctioning multiple Russians in December 2016 for their interference in U.S. 
Elections.214   
On October 31, 2017, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing with senior 
executives from Facebook, Google, and Twitter to discuss the extent of the Russian 
disinformation campaigns on their respective platforms.215  This public hearing was one 
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of America’s first opportunities to hear about what happened from the U.S. social media 
companies. It also provided politicians with the occasion to exert pressure on the 
companies to make constructive changes to their platforms.  
In December 2017, Congress reestablished the Global Engagement Center (GEC) 
as an agency within the State Department responsible for countering foreign state and non-
state propaganda and disinformation operations.216  Previously, the GEC was established 
under Executive Order 13721 in the Obama administration to counter foreign terrorist 
propaganda and online recruitment efforts.217  It would later pivot to focusing on exposing 
foreign state disinformation campaigns.  
On January 29, 2018, the FBI announced its Protected Voices Initiative. FBI 
Director Christopher Wray said it “provides tools and resources to political campaigns, 
companies, and individuals to protect against online foreign influence operations and 
cybersecurity threats.”218 Under the auspices of the initiative, the FBI provided 
cybersecurity briefings to, and stayed engaged with, the national-level political 
organizations. This security-based countermeasure was focused on protecting one of the 
primary targets for Russian information operations.  
On February 16, 2018, the Special Counsel’s Office indicted Yevgeniy Prigozhin 
and 12 employees of the IRA with eight criminal counts for their efforts to interfere in the 
2016 U.S. Elections.219  The unsealed indictment affidavit offered the first opportunity for 
the American public to learn about the extent of the scope and scale of the Russian 
influence operation. The unsealed indictment affidavit described in evidence-based detail 
what the IRA had propagated on social media against the American public. The 
accompanying arrest warrants showed the U.S. government’s intention to bring these 
Russians to face justice at some point.  
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On March 28, 2018, the Department of Treasury levied sanctions against 16 
Russian nationals for election interference-related activities. These included some of the 
individuals mentioned above whom the Special Counsel’s Office previously indicted. In 
addition, on June 11, 2018, another eight Russian nationals were sanctioned for associated 
activities.220  These were another set of measures likely designed to inflict punishment on 
the Russian actors and act as a deterrent for future activities targeting U.S. elections.  
On April 10–11, 2018, the Senate Commerce Committee and Senate Judiciary 
Committee held hearings on consecutive days with Mark Zuckerberg to discuss Russia’s 
influence campaigns on Facebook and its countermeasures to combat them.221  This 
hearing provided the American public with the opportunity to listen to one of the primary 
architects of the current social media landscape in the United States. The Senate 
committees also used this as an opportunity to hold Facebook accountable for its actions 
and exert pressure for positive change.  
On July 17, 2018, the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing with senior 
executives from Facebook, Google, and Twitter so they could provide updates on their 
companies’ efforts for content filtering to stop foreign influence campaigns on their 
platforms.222  On September 5, 2018, the Senate Intelligence Committee held a hearing 
with senior executives from Facebook and Twitter to discuss their companies’ efforts to 
stop foreign influence campaigns and illegal transactions on their platforms.223 Both of 
these hearings were additional occasions for Americans to learn about social media 
companies’ progress in safeguarding the upcoming election.  
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On October 19, 2018, the IRA’s chief accountant, Elena Alekseevna Khusyaynova, 
was indicted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia because of 
her role in the conspiracy to interfere with the U.S. political system, to include the 2016 
and 2018 U.S. elections.224  Khusyaynova’s unsealed indictment affidavit revealed the 
extent of the IRA’s financial transactions as the group waged its influence campaign 
against the United States.225  Moreover, as she is a regular Russian citizen without the 
privileges typical to Russian oligarchs or diplomats, her indictment may deter other 
Russians from working for the IRA or similar types of companies.  
The Washington Post reported that U.S. Cyber Command conducted an offensive 
cyber operation on November 2, 2018, against the St. Petersburg-based IRA office, a day 
before the U.S. Midterm Elections.226  This operation was believed to have knocked out 
the IRA’s computer networks for days. If true, this operation showed that the U.S. 
government was willing to reveal and deploy its technical capabilities to safeguard the 
integrity of the electoral process.  
On November 16, 2018, Congress enacted the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency Act of 2018. This legislation created the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency (CISA) under the Department of Homeland Security.227  In January 2017, 
DHS designated the election system infrastructure as the 17th critical infrastructure sector. 
CISA is the U.S. government agency charged with helping state and local governments 
secure America’s election systems.228  Both security-focused actions showed that the U.S. 
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government perceives elections are vital to national security and requires consolidating a 
host of protective cyber functions into one federal agency. 
In contrast to the 2016 U.S. elections, the executive and legislative branches of the 
U.S. government were active ahead of the 2018 elections as it took a series of security 
measures to shore up vulnerabilities in the different facets of the democratic process, such 
as providing cybersecurity briefings for political organizations, and enhance transparency 
about governmental actions to inform the American public, through the many 
Congressional hearings, law enforcement actions, and economic sanctions.  
d. Using the Kartapolov Framework to Evaluate Russian and American 
Measures in 2018 
For the 2018 U.S. elections, the Kartapolov Framework was used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the Russian actions, primarily through the efforts of the Internet Research 
Agency. It was also used to determine the efficacy of the American efforts, both private 
sector and governmental, to counter each element of the framework. As a reminder, the 
relevant elements of the framework for this evaluation are: (1) spreading discontent in the 
population; (2) exerting political pressure; and (3) confusing the political leadership.229   
After the 2016 U.S. elections, multiple researchers determined that the Internet 
Research Agency continued at the same cadence and volume of activity as before, 
seemingly undeterred by being outed in the news media and through government 
communications.230  The New Knowledge and Oxford University researchers noted that 
the Internet Research Agency used meticulous precision to identify different demographic 
groups by race and political affinities to amplify dissension with its online messaging.231  
Another purpose of the IRA’s messaging was to promote right-wing voter turnout and 
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suppress left-wing and Black voters.232  The IRA’s actions were trying to fulfill the first 
element of the Kartapolov Framework by trying to spread discontent in the American 
population. A review of the U.S. Census Bureau’s analysis of the 2018 elections voter 
turnout revealed a mixed outcome to what the IRA would have desired. The overall voter 
turnout was the highest in 40 years, with 53.4 percent of eligible voters going to the polls 
in 2018. This turnout contrasts to the 41.9 percent who came out to the polls in 2014, which 
was the lowest midterm election turnout in 40 years.233  Table 4 summarizes the increase 
in both Black and White voter turnout for the midterm elections. While the IRA promoted 
right-wing voter turnout, which are typically White voters, its efforts to suppress Black 
voter turnout failed.  
Table 4. Voter Turnout by Demographic in Midterm Elections.234 
Election Year Black Voter Turnout White Voter Turnout 
2014 40.6% 45.8% 
2018 51.4% 57.5% 
Change +10.8% +11.7% 
 
The Internet Research Agency’s ongoing activities must have exerted some 
political pressure on the private sector and the U.S. government because of the assortment 
and frequency of public actions taken by both entities in the run-up 2018 U.S. elections. 
Thus, the IRA fulfilled the second element of the framework by applying political pressure 
to the American social media companies and government, but the actions taken by both 
entities may have blunted the effectiveness of its influence campaigns. However, it does 
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not appear that the IRA’s campaigns confused the political leadership in the United States 
because the different governmental countermeasures listed in the previous section seemed 
frequent, deliberate, and proportional.   
Application of the Kartapolov Framework appeared to be more favorable to the 
social media companies’ countermeasures during the 2018 election cycle. The framework’s 
first element, spreading discontent in the population, was countered by the social media 
companies’ account takedown operations. As mentioned before, Facebook and Twitter 
identified and shut down accounts in 2018 at about the same levels as were identified in 
2016. The difference from 2016 was that the social media companies were able to disrupt 
the IRA’s activities before the 2018 elections. The framework’s second element, exerting 
political pressure, seemed to make the social media companies act more vigorously in 
policing their platforms and forthcoming in announcing any actions they took. The third 
element, confusing the political leadership, will be discussed in the next section when 
reviewing the efficacy of U.S. government countermeasures. Broadly speaking, the social 
media companies appeared to be better equipped and decisive in thwarting the IRA’s 
information operations during this election cycle.  
Overlaying the Kartapolov Framework’s elements on the U.S. government’s 
actions revealed a different outcome than in 2016. For the first element, spreading 
discontent in the population, the U.S. government showed very public attempts to educate 
the American public and hold Russian wrongdoing accountable. Through the Justice 
Department and the Treasury Department, the executive branch made public 
announcements of indictments and economic sanctions against Russians for their roles in 
election interference, respectively. In addition, the legislative branch held a series of public 
hearings to learn about the progress the social media companies were making to counter 
malign foreign influence and inform the American public.  
For the second element, exerting political pressure, the U.S. government was 
obliged to prevent a repeat of the 2016 interference by Russia. Although difficult to 
determine whether the U.S. government felt political pressure from the IRA’s influence 
campaign, it displayed a broad spectrum of countermeasures, which were listed in the prior 
section. Finally, for the third element, confusing the political leadership, both the executive 
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and legislative branches of the U.S. government appeared to be informed about the threat 
from Russian influence operations and took appropriate countermeasures to neutralize 
them.  
C. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE 2016 AND 2018 ELECTIONS 
In summary, a review of the recent history of Russia’s actions to interfere in the 
U.S. election and America’s actions to counter these actions revealed three conclusions. 
First, the Internet Research Agency was virtually unfettered in its social media campaign 
to sow division and confusion in the 2016 U.S. elections. Second, the U.S. government and 
social media companies’ countermeasures against the IRA ahead of the 2018 U.S. midterm 
elections appeared to be generally effective. Third, the Internet Research Agency appeared 
to be undeterred by the American efforts and made only slight modifications in its tactics 
from 2016 to 2018.  
Researchers have determined that Russian influence campaigns, especially those 
conducted ahead of the 2016 U.S. elections, can be effective for eliciting partisan 
responses.235  Governmental reports, research papers, and the social media companies 
themselves have acknowledged that the social media companies were unaware of the 
Russian disinformation campaigns taking place on their platforms and therefore took no 
active role in countering them. Congressional report findings criticized the executive 
branch of the government for a tepid and ineffective response to the Russian interference 
activities. Analysis of voter turnout revealed a relatively high overall high voter turnout 
but low Black voter turnout in the 2016 elections. This combination of factors may have 
led to Vladimir Putin achieving his desired goals of eroding American faith in its 
democratic process and the election of Donald Trump.236  Ambassador Michael McFaul 
noted that even if the impact of the Russian influence campaign was minimal, the margin 
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of victory for Trump was about 78,000 votes across three states that tipped the electoral 
college.237   
For the 2018 U.S. midterm elections, the combined countermeasures of the private 
sector and the U.S. government appeared to mitigate the effectiveness of the IRA’s 
influence operations. On December 18, 2018, Dan Coates, Director of National 
Intelligence, released a press statement in which he said the “Intelligence Community does 
not have intelligence reporting that indicates any compromise of our nation’s election 
infrastructure that would have prevented voting, changed vote counts or disrupted the 
ability to tally votes.”238  The ultimate proof was the record turnout of voters across all 
demographic groups, including Black voters.239   
Director Coates stated that Russia continued to conduct influence operations after 
the 2016 elections ahead of the 2018 elections.240  During this period, the IRA’s only shift 
in tactics appeared to be jettisoning its use of online political advertisements, which was 
probably the result of the social media companies changing their advertising policies to 
make it more difficult for foreign entities to purchase advertisements.241  However, the 
regular cadence of account shutdown announcements from the social media companies, 
reports by research firms, and U.S. government reports and statements indicated the 
Russians would continue to be active ahead of the 2020 U.S. elections. The uncertainty 
was whether the social media companies and the U.S. government would be up to the task 
of countering the Russian information operations.  
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III. THE 2020 ELECTIONS – RUSSIAN GAMBIT AND 
AMERICAN COUNTERPLAY 
Foreign nations continue to use influence measures in social and traditional 
media to sway U.S. voters’ preferences and perspectives, shift U.S. policies, 
increase discord, and undermine confidence in our democratic process. 
― William Evanina, July 24, 2020 
 
The elections of 2016 and 2018 put the major social media companies and the U.S. 
government on high alert about Russian interference. As a result, both entities were more 
aggressive in their efforts to thwart the Russians ahead of the 2020 elections. The social 
media companies partnered with the news media and research organizations to detect and 
disrupt these Russian disinformation operations. The U.S. government’s endeavors 
included law enforcement actions, threat briefings, and information sharing to the private 
sector. The cumulative effect of American countermeasures compelled the Russians to 
evolve their tactics and methods to evade detection continually. Ultimately, the American 
actions appeared effective in mitigating the Russian online tactics because voters were 
undeterred and turned out in record numbers for the election.   
This chapter reviews the Russian disinformation campaign targeting the 2020 U.S. 
elections, the countermeasures taken by the social media companies and the U.S. 
government. It then uses the Kartapolov Framework to evaluate the efficacy of those 
countermeasures, informing recommendations for counteracting future Russian 
disinformation campaigns in the next chapter. Finally, figure 5 provides some key 
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A. THE IRA AND OTHER PROXIES’ SOCIAL MEDIA ACTIVITIES 
From 2019 through 2020, the major social media companies reported most of the 
IRA’s activities with a couple of exceptions. On at least a quarterly basis, Facebook, 
Google, and Twitter made announcements regarding the detection and takedown of fake 
Russian accounts on their platforms via blogposts. In addition, many of the IRA-related 
activities involved account takedowns in various geographical locations, not just Russia-
based accounts. The exceptions to the major social media companies reporting Russian 
account takedowns came when other organizations were able to identify and expose the 
activities of the Internet Research Agency. In one instance, CNN broke a story about the 
IRA’s activities in March 2020.243  In a second instance, Graphika, a New York-based 
social media analysis company, issued reports on IRA activities and identified another 
cluster of Russia-controlled campaigns it dubbed “Secondary Infektion.”244  These 
account takedowns appeared to be coordinated across different organizations as Facebook 
and Twitter made their own announcements after the reporting by CNN and Graphika.  
Different Russian proxy organizations focused on specific voting groups to affect 
their attitudes. For example, the Internet Research Agency established a front organization 
called Eliminating Barriers for the Liberation of Africa (EBLA) with offices in Western 
Africa.245  On March 12, 2020, CNN exposed EBLA when it televised a news story with 
an associated news article about EBLA being a Russian troll farm.246  Through its 
investigation, CNN determined the head of EBLA was a Russian-speaking Ghanaian 
named Seth Wiredu, who called himself “Mr. Amara” and registered the organization in 
June 2019.247 CNN assessed he was being funded through Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s Project 
Lakhta. Wiredu managed offices outside Accra, Ghana, and Lagos, Nigeria, with 
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employees who portrayed themselves as African Americans and engaged in social media 
activities.248  The EBLA employees focused primarily on racial issues such as police 
brutality, displays of anger towards white people, and black empowerment.249  Figure 6 
provides an example of the types of postings put out by EBLA. In a similar fashion to the 
IRA’s operations in St. Petersburg, the EBLA employees received assignments on different 
themes, coordinated their postings, and worked on cross-platform campaigns.250  Before 
it was outed, the EBLA organization appeared to be laying the groundwork for influencing 
the behavior of Black voters ahead of the 2020 U.S. elections.  
Figure 6. An Image from a Facebook Account Controlled by EBLA.251 
 
Although the Russians tried to evolve their tactics to evade detection by the social 
media companies, the effort failed because the social media companies partnered with other 
 
248 Ward et al. 
249 Ward et al. 
250 Ward et al. 
251 Source:  Ward et al. 
61 
organizations to detect and expose the Russians. One example highlighted this 
collaboration. On September 1, 2020, Facebook and Twitter announced that they had 
identified and taken down social media accounts associated with an English and Arabic 
language website called “PeaceData,” which portrayed itself as a progressive-leaning 
independent news site.252  Figure 7 shows two postings from the PeaceData site.  
In coordination with Facebook, Graphika issued a report on PeaceData, which 
provided detailed information about the site itself, an analysis of images on the site, and 
the site’s writers.253  This development was notable for four reasons. First, the site was an 
example of the IRA shifting content off the social media platforms to a website which it 
controlled. Second, Graphika analyzed the profile photos of several PeaceData staff 
members and determined they were created through generative adversarial networks 
(GANS), which is a type of artificial intelligence.254  These photos were the first known 
instance of the IRA using artificial intelligence to generate phony images of people. 
Examples of these GANS-generated profile photos appear in Figure 8. Third, Reuters broke 
a story about the IRA posing as PeaceData staff to hire unwitting freelance journalists, 
including Americans, to write articles for the site.255  The Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace determined that at least 20 freelance journalists had been duped into 
writing articles for the PeaceData outlet.256  This instance is the first identified example of 
the IRA hiring unwitting individuals to generate content on its behalf. Fourth, Facebook 
shared information about the PeaceData site and associated social media networks with 
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Graphika.257  This collaboration revealed Facebook joining forces with a non-social media 
company third party to analyze its findings.  
Figure 7. Postings from the PeaceData Site.258 
 
Figure 8. Photos of PeaceData Staff Created by Artificial Intelligence.259 
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The Russians continued to demonstrate different tactics such as using alternative 
communication platforms, artificial intelligence to generate false personas, and unwitting 
co-optees to avoid detection by the social media companies and the U.S. government. Not 
only did the Russians use the PeaceData site to appeal to progressives, but they also created 
another site called the Newsroom for American and European Based Citizens (NAEBC) to 
appeal to conservatives.260  On October 1, 2020, Reuters published an article that exposed 
NAEBC as another news outlet run by the IRA, which appeared to be the ideological 
counterpart of the PeaceData outlet.261  Figure 9 shows an example of a posting on 
NAEBC. Figure 10 shows an example of cross-posting of NAEBC content on Gab. 
The NAEBC site was noteworthy for three reasons. First, in addition to the 
mainstream social media platforms of Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn, the IRA used two 
right-wing social media platforms, Gab and Parler, to disseminate content from 
NAEBC.262  Second, Figure 11 shows that the IRA continued using GANS-generated staff 
profile photos on NAEBC to convey a sense of authenticity.263  Lastly, Graphika 
determined that the IRA used various social media accounts to engage with real users and 
convince them to post on the NAEBC site, which met with some success.264  However, 
Graphika assessed that both the PeaceData and NAEBC outlets had limited influence 
because they were created around June 2020 and taken down by September 2020 before 
either could generate much viewership.265  Furthermore, Graphika opined that the purpose 
for both the websites was two-fold. First, the sites wanted to influence voter turnout 
through the type of content on each site. For example, on the PeaceData site, Graphika 
believed articles denigrating Joe Biden compared to other Democratic candidates would 
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suppress Democratic voter turnout.266  Second, the content on both PeaceData and 
NAEBC was meant to inflame existing discord within their viewership.267   
Figure 9. Posting from the NAEBC Site.268 
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Figure 11. GANS-generated Profile Photos for NAEBC Staff.270 
 
The Russians targeted the far-right channels as well as the mainstream ones to reach 
different target audiences. In addition to its work analyzing the aforementioned IRA 
activities, Graphika conducted an independent investigation into another Russian 
information operation dubbed “Secondary Infektion.”271  Graphika determined this group 
has been active from 2014 to at least the beginning of 2020 and characterized the online 
campaigns as focusing on misinformation about foreign policy and diplomacy-related 
matters.272  Although the content appeared in multiple languages, Graphika deduced the 
campaigns focused on targeting viewers in Europe and North America.273  Its analysis of 
the top themes in the content revealed that the articles primarily concentrated on 
denigrating Ukraine, the United States, NATO, and sowing discord in the rest of 
Europe.274 Figure 12 shows the breakdown of articles by quantity and topic. Thus, the 
Russians had expanded far beyond using the Internet Research Agency as a proxy for its 
disinformation campaigns.   
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Figure 12. Breakdown of Secondary Infektion Articles by Topic.275 
 
Secondary Infektion had two features that distinguished it from the other IRA-
controlled campaigns. First, the actors behind Secondary Infektion made extensive use of 
forged postings and documents in an attempt to proliferate disinformation and propagate 
conflict.276  Second, Graphika observed that Secondary Infektion used a wide-ranging set 
of online platforms, especially micro-blogging sites, to disseminate content, not only the 
mainstream social media platforms.277  Examples of a forged post and forged document 
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are shown in Figures 13 and 14, respectively. The Russians extended their reach across 
multiple channels and platforms by agilely adapting their tactics. 
Figure 13. Secondary Infektion-made Forged Posting from Marco Rubio.278 
 
Figure 14. Secondary Infektion-made Forged Letter to John Kerry.279 
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By being everywhere simultaneously, the Russians effectively reduced the 
likelihood of being shut down, given the reach of their operations. In discussion with some 
social media companies, Graphika believed the extensive variety of sites used by 
Secondary Infektion could be related to operational security.280  Specifically, this type of 
behavior would reduce the impact of takedowns by any one company and make 
coordinated takedowns more difficult across multiple companies.281  The social media 
companies told Graphika that the actors behind the Secondary Infektion activities used 
good security practices because they were consistent and disciplined about using “burner” 
accounts, which were registered, used to create a series of posts, and then abandoned within 
the day.282  Graphika and the social media companies determined that Russian operators 
conducted Secondary Infektion. Still, they could not determine whether the campaign was 
associated with the IRA, GRU, or other Russia-based groups.283  The Secondary Infektion 
campaigns were another example of the Russians trying to adjust their tactics to avoid 
detection by the social media companies.  
B. PRIVATE SECTOR COUNTERMEASURES 
Ahead of the 2020 U.S. elections, the major social media companies, consisting of 
Facebook, Google, and Twitter, continued their transparency efforts by regularly providing 
public notifications of foreign influence-related account takedowns. These notifications 
typically provided summaries of the activities the companies identified, the number of 
accounts taken down, and how these accounts violated their terms of service. In addition, 
all three companies published security measures regarding technology improvements and 
policy changes on their platforms ahead of the elections.284 
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In 2019, Facebook announced two sets of takedowns. First, on October 21, 2019, it 
removed 50 Instagram and one Facebook account, which originated from Russia and 
focused on American users. Then, on October 30, 2019, Facebook removed five Instagram 
accounts, 35 Facebook accounts, 53 Pages, and seven Groups, which originated from 
Russia and focused on users in African countries (Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Central African Republic, and 
Madagascar).285  These actions showed that the IRA’s activities persisted and expanded 
into targeting different countries and that Facebook was actively monitoring its platform 
and taking efforts to disrupt the IRA.  
Social media companies uncovered even deeper links to Russia. In 2020, Facebook 
announced six sets of takedowns. All of them are summarized in Table 5. In contrast to 
2016, when 470 IRA accounts were identified, Facebook identified and shut down 825 
accounts in 2020. In one noteworthy takedown, Facebook discovered Facebook accounts, 
pages, and groups controlled by the GRU, targeting Ukraine and other Eastern European 
countries, and announced their removal on February 12, 2020.286  The use of the GRU for 
disinformation campaigns appeared to be a new tactic by the Russians. As mentioned 
before, the GRU was responsible for the hack and dump attack of the Democratic National 
Committee in 2016 but had not previously engaged in social media influence campaigns. 
After the Internet Research Agency and Secondary Infektion, the GRU would be the third 
different Russian-controlled entity discovered to be conducting influence campaigns ahead 
of the 2020 elections. These takedowns confirmed the ongoing social media-focused 
portion of the Russian influence strategy. 
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Table 5. Summary of Facebook Takedowns for 2020.287 
Type 
Month 
February March April August September October 
Facebook Account 78 49 91 13 229 0 
Facebook Page 11 69 46 2 36 2 
Facebook Group 29 0 2 0 19 0 
Instagram Account 4 85 1 0 37 22 
Total 122 203 140 15 321 24 
Grand Total 825 
 
On March 12, 2020, Facebook announced another noteworthy takedown, in which 
it shut down 85 Instagram accounts, 69 Pages, and 49 Facebook accounts.288  Its takedown 
coincided with the CNN story regarding the Eliminating Barriers for the Liberation of 
Africa organization discussed above. Facebook assessed that individuals from Russia had 
recruited locals in Ghana and Nigeria to build an online social network and develop an 
audience; EBLA controlled at least one Instagram account with over 260,000 followers 
and one Facebook account with over 13,000 followers.289  The IRA’s expansion into West 
Africa mirrored Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s business interests on the continent and suggested 
the IRA thought its troll-farm model could be successfully exported into other countries.290  
These takedowns demonstrated that Facebook successfully identified Russian 
disinformation operations despite a shift in their tactics.   
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In 2019, Twitter announced two takedowns totaling 422 IRA-controlled accounts, 
which made about 929,000 tweets.291  Figure 15 demonstrates a categorization of tweets 
by topic. A review of these tweets revealed a continued focus on the 2018 midterm U.S. 
elections, with seven percent of all tweets, where Democrats had taken over control of the 
House of Representatives. The other prominent topics focused on promoting Trump, a 
right-wing meme that accused the FBI of misusing the Steele dossier to obtain a 
surveillance order on Trump associate, Carter Page, and Islamophobic rhetoric. The themes 
promoted by the IRA on Twitter showed its continued acuity in determining the hot-button 
issues that would agitate right-wing voters.  
Figure 15. Breakdown of Twitter Tweets by Topic for 2019.292 
 
 
On November 11, 2019, Twitter announced a ban on virtually all political 
advertisements.293 It made a few minor exceptions for issue-based ads and news 
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organizations already exempted from its policy. Twitter “defines political advertising as 
referencing a candidate, political party, elected or appointed government official, election, 
referendum, ballot measure, legislation, regulation, directive or judicial outcome.”294 
Although Twitter was the first of the major social media companies to ban political 
advertisements, critics in news media perceived it as an expedient move meant to earn 
goodwill with the public while only costing less than one percent of its quarterly 
revenue.295   
Expanding beyond earlier takedowns, the major social media companies 
coordinated their publicity for more significant impact and established more direct links to 
Russia. In 2020, Twitter announced four sets of takedowns, as summarized in Table 6. For 
2020, a total of 1,233 accounts were taken down, versus the 3,814 accounts identified as 
being controlled by the IRA in 2016. One noteworthy takedown occurred on March 12, 
2020, when Twitter announced the shutdown of 71 accounts operated by the Eliminating 
Barriers for the Liberation of Africa organization in Ghana and Nigeria.296  Twitter 
attributed them to Russian-sponsored activities, which CNN characterized as an attempt 
“to sow discord by engaging in conversations about social issues, like race and civil 
rights.”297  The synchronization of announcements by Facebook and Twitter with the CNN 
breaking story suggests some level of coordination between the three companies.  
Another significant Twitter takedown occurred in June 2020, with the shutdown of 
1152 accounts, which Twitter and the Stanford Internet Observatory attributed a campaign 
dubbed the “Current Policy” to the IRA because of the anti-Western and pro-Putin content 
it disseminated.298  Stanford’s analysis determined the Current Policy accounts posted 
more than 3.4 million tweets since 2013, with some focused on portraying actual Russian 
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government agencies and others working to boost specific Russian politicians or federal 
initiatives.299  These actions revealed coordination among the social media companies, 
news media, and a research organization to thwart Russian disinformation operations.  
Table 6. Summary of Twitter Takedowns for 2020.300 
Type 
Month 
March June September October 
Account 71 1152 5 5 
Grand Total 1,233 
  
At the beginning of 2020, Twitter announced an enhancement of its safety policies, 
developing better tools for detecting abusive behavior, and aggressively taking actions 
against violations of the terms of service.301  Twitter also highlighted its collaboration with 
political parties, researchers, and election officials. In addition, a Twitter spokesperson 
stressed the importance of staying in contact with state election officials and law 
enforcement.302   
On November 26, 2019, Google announced it had shut down 15 YouTube channels 
and associated Google accounts. These IRA-controlled accounts used English, French, and 
Arabic language content to target users in South Africa, Madagascar, Sudan, and the 
Central African Republic. Google said these accounts were associated with the account 
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takedowns Facebook had announced on October 30, 2019.303  This statement confirmed 
joint action facilitated by information sharing between the two companies.  
On March 3, 2020, Google announced it had developed policies prohibiting 
deceptive practices such as voter suppression and misrepresentation in all its products, 
including Google Ads, YouTube, and the Google Play Store.304  The company also 
mentioned working closely with other technology companies and the FBI regarding 
referrals and leads.305  This announcement by Google showed an effort to be more 
transparent, coordinate with other social media companies, and acknowledge some 
engagement with the FBI.  
In April 2020, Google’s Threat Analyst Group began to blog about account 
takedowns every quarter. Table 7 provides a summary of the number and types of accounts 
taken down by Google. For 2020, Google took down a total of 129 accounts, which is lower 
in number than in 2016, when it identified and submitted 228 YouTube videos and 655 
AdWord advertisements to the Senate Intelligence Committee for review.306 
Table 7. Summary of Google Takedowns for 2020.307 
Type 
Month 
April May June October November 
YouTube Channel 22 47 17 28 10 
Blog 3 0 0 1 0 
AdSense Account 0 1 0 0 0 
Total 25 48 17 29 10 
Grand Total 129 
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C. U.S. GOVERNMENT COUNTERMEASURES 
Ahead of the 2020 U.S. elections, the U.S. government appeared publicly focused 
on transparency efforts, such as public statements and a hearing, and modifying the policies 
regarding interactions with political campaigns. The U.S. government also took security 
steps, such as information sharing with relevant stakeholders, including social media 
companies and political campaigns. The major social media companies mentioned working 
with the U.S. government to some extent. Some news reporting corroborated this 
engagement between the private sector companies and the U.S. government.  
Only one public Congressional hearing took place before the U.S. elections on 
November 3, 2020. On September 18, 2019, the Senate Commerce Committee held a 
hearing with senior executives from Facebook, Google, and Twitter to discuss their 
companies’ efforts to remove extremist content and disinformation from their 
platforms.308 This hearing was the only opportunity in 2019 for the American public 
through Congressional testimony and for Congress to publicly hold the companies 
accountable for the actions they previously pledged to protect the elections.  
On May 15, 2020, to address foreign interference threats more directly, William 
Evanina, Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC), was 
tasked with leading all the U.S. government threat intelligence briefings to the relevant 
national political committees and presidential campaign committees.309  The ODNI likely 
changed the briefers from a rotating cadre of analysts from the FBI and DHS to streamline 
the process for the recipients and let the political campaigns and all Americans know the 
entire U.S. Intelligence Community backs these threat briefings.310 
Before the 2020 U.S. elections, the FBI took some public actions related to election 
security. On October 23, 2019, FBI Director Wray announced an expansion of the 
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Protected Voices Initiative.311 New cybersecurity training videos and reference materials 
were added to the website. Furthermore, the FBI indicated it would provide cybersecurity 
training to all of the presidential campaigns ahead of the primary election season.312  This 
training supplemented the FBI’s ongoing engagement with the national-level political 
committees. This security-related action continued the FBI’s efforts to help the various 
political campaigns safeguard their computer networks and electronic devices.  
On January 16, 2020, the FBI stated it was modifying its notification policy 
regarding computer intrusions to election infrastructure. Previously, the FBI would notify 
local election officials whose organizations typically owned and maintained the election 
systems and equipment. The local officials would be responsible for informing the state-
level officials. With this policy change, the FBI would simultaneously notify the designated 
chief state-level election official as well as the local officials impacted by a cyber-attack. 
According to the FBI press release, “this new policy will result in increased collaboration 
between all levels of government for the integrity and security of U.S. elections.”313  Thus, 
the FBI appeared to publicly state affirmative actions it was taking to safeguard the 
elections. Previously, the FBI had been typically reluctant to disclose election-related 
actions to the public.  
Despite not making public announcements about its involvement with the private 
sector, the U.S. government appeared to be more engaged with social media companies 
ahead of the 2020 U.S. elections than in 2016. On September 4, 2019, Facebook hosted an 
election security meeting with the FBI, DHS, and ODNI.314  The other companies 
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attending the meeting included Google, Microsoft, and Twitter.315  The group discussed 
plans for better coordination and information sharing.316  This meeting was the first 
indication of private sector companies meeting with the U.S. government to safeguard the 
2020 U.S. elections. In August 2020, the New York Times broke a story revealing that the 
private sector companies working with the U.S. government had expanded to include the 
Wikimedia Foundation, Verizon Media, Reddit, Pinterest, and LinkedIn.317  A 
spokesperson for the private sector companies stated that they regularly met with the U.S. 
government agencies responsible for election security to discuss threat trends and worked 
closely with each represented company to protect their platforms.318 
Public statements from some social media companies revealed that the U.S. 
government, particularly the FBI, had provided them with tipper information to detect 
Russian influence operations on their platforms. In August 2020, Facebook announced that 
it had taken down two pages and 13 Facebook accounts, which the IRA was controlling, 
and mentioned finding the cluster due to off-platform activities identified by the FBI.319  
In September 2020, Facebook and Twitter announced the takedown of PeaceData-
associated accounts being controlled by the IRA.320  Facebook stated that it had been able 
to identify the accounts based on off-platform information provided by the FBI.321  Twitter 
went further in its statement when it expressly thanked the FBI’s Foreign Influence Task 
Force for its “close collaboration and continued support of our work to protect the public 
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a network of IRA-controlled Facebook and Instagram operated out of Mexico and 
Venezuela.323  Once again, Facebook mentioned its ability to identify these accounts based 
on information provided by the FBI.324  Also, in October 2020, Google noted it had shut 
down one blog and 26 YouTube channels being operated by the IRA.325  In addition, 
Google’s Threat Analysis Group mentioned it had received leads provided by the FBI to 
support its internal investigation.326  In total, the FBI appears to have shared information 
with Facebook, Google, and Twitter on at least four occasions, which led to the detection 
and takedown of multiple IRA-controlled accounts on their respective platforms. This 
sharing contrasted with 2016 when it seemed that the U.S. government had not shared any 
threat information with the social media companies ahead of the 2016 U.S. elections.  
Besides the FBI and DHS, other U.S. government agencies were also publicly 
involved in election security. For example, in August 2020, the NSA, jointly with the FBI, 
issued a cybersecurity advisory exposing complex malware dubbed “Drovorub,” created 
by Russian Military Intelligence.327  This advisory was the first of its kind and would allow 
private and public sector organizations to safeguard themselves ahead of the election. Also, 
in August 2020, the State Department’s Global Engagement Center issued an extensive 
report revealing the disinformation tactics employed by the Russian government and 
associated organizations, such as the IRA.328  The State Department believed this report 
would help news media, private and public sector organizations, and other governments 
detect and analyze Russian influence operations to build up a collective resilience.329  
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During the elections, the U.S. government had little to do with the actual 
administration of political campaigns or elections. Instead, the U.S. government was 
responsible for providing funding to states for equipment upgrades, conducting 
enforcement actions to ensure fair elections, and keeping the American public apprised of 
any significant developments.330  On November 4, 2020, after the election polls had closed 
across the United States, Christopher Krebs, Director of the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency, issued a statement that the U.S. government had seen no 
evidence of Russian or other foreign adversaries changing ballots or preventing Americans 
from voting. In December 2020, Krebs reaffirmed his belief about the integrity of the 2020 
U.S. Elections during a hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs in December 2020.331  Senior election executives representing 
America’s election infrastructure sector made a statement that echoed Krebs’ claim of a 
safe and fair election.332   
In March 2021, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued the 
Intelligence Community’s report assessing foreign threats to the 2020 U.S. elections.333  
Similar to what NCSC Director Evanina said in his August 2020 statement, the ODNI 
assessment emphasized the ongoing and concerted Russian disinformation campaign, 
which was designed to promote the reelection of President Trump, denigrate Joe Biden and 
the Democratic Party, erode trust in the election process, and inflame political and social 
tensions within the United States.334  The ODNI discussed the efforts of the Internet 
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Research Agency and highlighted the “short-lived troll farms” based in Mexico and 
Western Africa, which were initiated to avoid the ongoing account takedown efforts by the 
social media companies with help from the U.S. government.335  The ODNI concluded 
that greater awareness by the news media and the American public, coupled with the 
actions taken by the social media companies and the U.S. government, likely countered the 
Russian efforts to some degree.336   
D. USING THE KARTAPOLOV FRAMEWORK TO EVALUATE RUSSIAN 
AND AMERICAN MEASURES IN 2020 
As previously used for appraising IRA information operations during the elections 
in 2016 and 2018, the relevant components of the Kartapolov Framework were used to 
evaluate the Russian and American efforts to determine their effectiveness for the 2020 
U.S. Elections. To reiterate, these components are: (1) spreading discontent in the 
population, (2) exerting political pressure, and (3) confusing the political leadership.337 
The impact of the Russian campaigns on American political leadership will be gauged in 
the section evaluating the countermeasures taken by the U.S. government. 
1. The IRA and Other Proxies – Impact and Evolution 
The Internet Research Agency evolved its tactics ahead of the 2020 U.S. elections 
but was unsuccessful in achieving its ultimate desired outcome of a Trump reelection. The 
IRA’s tactical developments were two-fold:  (1) moving troll farm operations to locations 
outside of Russia, namely West Africa and Mexico, and (2) moving content from the social 
media platforms to websites the IRA controlled. For the first component of the Kartapolov 
Framework, a review of all four of the IRA’s campaigns for 2020 showed they were 
focused on inflaming dissension in the populace. CNN evaluated the social media content 
disseminated by Eliminating Barriers for the Liberation of Africa and noted it was 
primarily focused on racial issues such as Black empowerment and used language meant 
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to inflame divisions between American racial groups.338  For the PeaceData outlet, 
Graphika’s analysis determined the actors behind it were targeting progressive groups in 
the United States, especially those who identified with democratic socialism.339  The 
Newsroom for American and European Based Citizens site appeared to be the 
counterweight to PeaceData. It targeted viewers with a far-right ideology because it 
covered topics such as racist tropes about black people and criticism of the Black Lives 
Matter movement.340  Lastly, the Secondary Infektion campaign’s focus on diplomacy and 
foreign policy appeared to be tailored to denigrate the United States and its European allies 
while also trying to foment conflict between the allied countries.341  Although the Russian 
actions likely inflamed already existing dissension in the United States, it did not appear to 
deter voter turnout at all. The effectiveness of the Russian messaging was probably blunted 
by the account takedowns by the major social media companies and being outed by the 
news media before it could develop traction with the targeted audiences.  
For the second component of the Kartapolov Framework, exerting political 
pressure, the Russian campaigns appeared to have mixed results. On the one hand, from 
interviews conducted with the social media companies, CNN determined that the IRA-
controlled organization, Eliminating Barriers for the Liberation of Africa, had successfully 
gathered many followers for its social media accounts since its inception in June 2019.342  
Facebook reported to CNN that the EBLA-controlled accounts had about 267,000 users 
following EBLA-controlled Facebook or Instagram accounts.343  Twitter reported that 
EBLA-controlled accounts had about 68,000 followers before being shut down.344  
Although the number of followers does not directly correlate to the amount of political 
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pressure, it indicates that EBLA’s content resonated enough with social media users to 
convince them to follow the EBLA-controlled accounts.  
On the other hand, the other Russian campaigns appeared to be less effective in 
creating political pressure. Since its inception in February 2020, the PeaceData site 
averaged about ten posts per day on the English-language page and 20 posts per day on the 
Arabic-language page.345  Twitter noted that the PeaceData-associated Twitter accounts 
were “low quality and spammy,” and assessed they did not garner much attention from 
other Twitter users.346  Facebook also took down a few PeaceData-associated Facebook 
and Instagram accounts but did not characterize how other users engaged with these 
accounts.347  The Newsroom for American and European Based Citizens outlet started in 
June 2020 but did not appear to attract much of a social media following. Graphika 
discovered that only about 14,000 users on Parler and 3,000 users on Gab followed the 
NAEBC site.348  The Secondary Infektion campaign appeared to be prolific during its 
existence. Still, Graphika noted that the vast majority of the content produced did not 
garner much, if any, engagement with other users.349  Graphika opined that the operators 
behind Secondary Infektion were motivated more by hitting production metrics than 
content engagement or virality.350  The ability of the Russian influence campaigns to 
generate political pressure may have been dampened by the social media company account 
takedowns and exposure by media outlets and Graphika, which will be discussed in more 
detail in the next section.  
For the third component of the Kartapolov Framework, namely confusing the 
political leadership, the impact of the Internet Research Agency and other Russian proxies’ 
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actions will be discussed in the section evaluating the impact of the U.S. government’s 
actions.  
2. The Private Sector Companies’ Impact and Adaptations 
The effectiveness of the private sector countermeasures used against the Russian 
influence operations targeting the 2020 U.S. election was evaluated using the Kartapolov 
Framework. To combat the first component, spreading discontent in the American public, 
the private sector responded to take security-focused actions. Specifically, the companies 
enhanced their detection systems to identify and disrupt Russian influence activities before 
gaining much traction with their users. As a result, each of the prominent social media 
companies had somewhat different results from 2016 to 2020, shown in table 8. 
Table 8. Social Media Account Takedowns between 2016 and 2020.351 
Company 
Number of Accounts Taken Down 
2016 2020 Difference 
Facebook 470 825 +355 
Google 883 129 -754 
Twitter 1,233 3,814 +2,581 
 
While Facebook and Twitter saw an increase in IRA-controlled accounts on their 
platforms, Google saw a decrease in accounts taken down. A partial explanation for this 
phenomenon could be that Instagram, a wholly-owned Facebook subsidiary, was the most 
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conducive social media platform for propagating memes, which has become prevalent in 
popular culture and was also favored by the IRA.352  Another explanation was that the IRA 
might have needed to shift resources away from YouTube activities to develop the 
PeaceData and Newsroom for American and European Based Citizens outlets.  
Another method for stopping the spread of discontent in the population was for the 
private sector companies to share data from foreign influence-related account takedowns 
with third-party organizations, such as researchers and research institutions. After the 2016 
U.S. Elections, each of the companies shared data with the Senate Committee on 
Intelligence, who in turn shared it with researchers to analyze it.353  Since that time, each 
company has shared data to varying degrees with researchers and other organizations. For 
example, in June 2020, Twitter shared information with Stanford University regarding the 
detection and takedown of Chinese, Russian, and Turkish influence campaigns on their 
platform.354  Twitter shared the data with Stanford as an objective third party to analyze 
and publish the results in service of increased transparency.355  In September 2020, 
Graphika revealed Facebook had given it data regarding the PeaceData outlet.356  In 
October 2020, Graphika received information from Facebook and Twitter regarding the 
Newsroom for American and European Based Citizens outlet.357  These examples 
illustrated the social media sharing information with third parties to presumably publicize 
objective analysis regarding IRA disinformation and tactics to the public.    
All of the major social media companies took visible measures to counter political 
pressure, the second component of the Kartapolov Framework, which the IRA exerted 
through its online influence activities on the different social media platforms. These 
transparency-focused actions included the increased cadence of each company’s public 
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notifications to the general public regarding account takedowns. A secondary 
transparency-focused action was each company’s effort to enact and improve its 
advertising purchasing policies. For Facebook and Google, these improvements appeared 
to make it more difficult for foreign actors to purchase political advertisements.358  Twitter 
went the furthest of the three social media companies by banning political ads entirely in 
its November 2019 announcement.359  The third type of transparency-focused action was 
the attempt by companies to improve the labeling of content. Again, Twitter appeared to 
be the most aggressive of the three social media companies. In May 2020, Twitter 
announced that labeling would be applied to all content disputed, misleading, or 
synthetically generated.360  In June 2020, Facebook made a similar announcement and 
modified its policies to improve transparency for political content and advertisements.361 
Thus, the private sector companies’ collective security and transparency-related actions 
seemed to diminish the impact of the Russian influence operations by preventing them 
from gaining much traction on the social media platforms.  
3. The U.S. Government’s Impact – Transparency and Private Sector 
Partnerships 
Examining the U.S. government’s actions to protect the 2020 U.S. Elections 
through the Kartapolov Framework revealed a more robust response than in 2016. For the 
first element of the framework, spreading discontent across the populace, the U.S. 
government took a range of security and transparency-related actions to impede Russian 
influence operations. Likely the most significant action was the FBI’s reported information 
sharing with the social media companies on at least four occasions, which led to the 
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companies identifying and taking down multiple clusters of IRA-controlled accounts.362  
In addition, the U.S. government meeting with the private sector companies on at least two 
separate occasions to share information on threat trends may have added context and 
atmospherics to enhance the companies’ detection methods.363  Finally, the report issued 
by the State Department’s Global Engagement Center in August 2020 may be regarded as 
a U.S. government transparency effort to expose Russian disinformation tactics to the 
American public and blunt the impact of these tactics.364  In general, the U.S. government 
appeared more actively engaged with the social media companies ahead of the 2020 
elections.  
For the second element of the Kartapolov Framework, exerting political pressure, 
the U.S. government took a series of measures, which may have diffused the pressure that 
Russia was trying to apply through its information operations. The FBI’s Protected Voice 
Initiative, which provided cybersecurity training to the national level political parties and 
presidential campaigns, was coupled with the classified threat briefings to the same 
organizations provided by National Counterintelligence and Security Center’s Director 
William Evanina.365  Furthermore, the FBI modified its victim notification process by 
including designated state-level election officials when notifying local or county-level 
election officials of cybersecurity issues.366  Finally, the highly detailed joint NSA/FBI 
cybersecurity advisory regarding the Drovorub malware exposed one of the Russian 
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military’s most potent cyber weapons, providing organizations with time to protect 
themselves ahead of the elections.367  This combination of actions by the U.S. government 
probably ensured no significant data breaches at any national-level political parties or 
campaigns during the 2020 U.S Elections.  
For the third element of the Kartapolov Framework, confusing the political 
leadership, the U.S. government, both the executive and legislative branches, appeared to 
be focused and decisive in its endeavors to safeguard the 2020 U.S. Elections. In September 
2019, the Republican-chaired Senate Commerce Committee called a hearing with senior 
executives from Facebook, Google, and Twitter to learn about their progress in removing 
disinformation and violent content from their platforms.368  The following year, public 
statements made by NCSC Director William Evanina in July 2020 and August 2020 gave 
a clear indication that the U.S. Intelligence Community was aware of Russian activities 
targeting the elections and decided to inform the American public.369  In a similar vein, on 
the day after the elections closed, Christopher Krebs, Director of the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency, stated that the U.S. government had “no evidence any 
foreign adversary was capable of preventing Americans from voting or changing vote 
tallies.”370  In October 2020, the Department of Justice indicted six officers in the Russian 
Military Intelligence Unit 74455, responsible for hacking attacks in Georgia and Ukraine, 
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and the Winter Olympics in South Korea.371  Some of these GRU officers had been 
previously indicted for hacking the Democratic National Committee in 2016.372  
Interestingly, the Department of Justice highlighted the assistance of the threat intelligence 
teams from Google and Cisco for this indictment.373  Additionally, the report on Russian 
disinformation tactics issued by the State Department and the joint cybersecurity advisory 
issued by the NSA and FBI rounded out the U.S. government’s multi-agency approach to 
exposing malign Russian activities through different avenues.  
E. VOTER TURNOUT IN THE 2020 ELECTIONS 
The two most important indicators of a secure and successful election were high 
voter turnout and no evidence of systemic voter fraud. The Pew Research Center 
determined that 2020 had the highest voter turnout since 1960, with approximately 158 
million Americans casting ballots.374  Table 9 shows a comparison in voter turnout 
between 2016 and 2020, both of which were presidential election years. In addition, 
multiple news organizations and think tanks on both sides of the aisle reported that the 
2020 U.S. elections were free of any systemic voter fraud, impacting the results.375   
  
 
371 Department of Justice, “Six Russian GRU Officers Charged in Connection with Worldwide 
Deployment of Destructive Malware and Other Disruptive Actions in Cyberspace,” Department of Justice, 
October 19, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/six-russian-gru-officers-charged-connection-worldwide-
deployment-destructive-malware-and. 
372 Department of Justice. 
373 Department of Justice. 
374 Drew DeSilver, “Turnout Soared in 2020 as Nearly Two-Thirds of Eligible U.S. Voters Cast 
Ballots for President,” Pew Research Center Fact Tank (blog), January 28, 2021, 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/01/28/turnout-soared-in-2020-as-nearly-two-thirds-of-
eligible-u-s-voters-cast-ballots-for-president/. 
375 Brennan Center for Justice, “It’s Official: The Election Was Secure | Brennan Center for Justice,” 
Brennan Center for Justice (blog), December 11, 2020, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-
reports/its-official-election-was-secure; Nick Corasaniti, Reid J. Epstein, and Jim Rutenberg, “The Times 
Called Officials in Every State: No Evidence of Voter Fraud,” New York Times, November 11, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/10/us/politics/voting-fraud.html; Justin Grimmer, Haritz Garro, and 
Andrew Eggers, “No Evidence For Voter Fraud: A Guide To Statistical Claims About The 2020 Election,” 
Text (Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institution, February 3, 2021), https://www.hoover.org/research/no-evidence-
voter-fraud-guide-statistical-claims-about-2020-election; Reality Check Team, “US Election 2020: Fact-
Checking Trump Team’s Main Fraud Claims,” BBC News, November 23, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/
news/election-us-2020-55016029. 
89 
Table 9. Comparison of Overall Voter Turnout for Presidential 
Elections.376 
Election Year Number of Voters Turning Out Percentage of  Voter Turnout 
2016 137,500,000 61.4% 
2020 158,000,000 66.2% 
Change +20,500,000 +4.8% 
 
It is still unclear whether the IRA’s operations contributed to the record number of 
Americans to vote or suppress turnout among Black voters in 2016. The U.S. Census 
Bureau will not have an analysis of voter demographics for the 2020 elections until late in 
2021. Despite the lack of demographic data for 2020, the Russian attempts to depress voter 
turnout were unsuccessful as Americans turned out in record numbers.  
F. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE 2020 U.S. ELECTIONS 
Reflecting on the 2020 elections, three main themes emerged. First, the Russians 
continued their efforts to target the U.S. elections while shifting tactics to avoid detection. 
Second, the social media companies, along with news media and research organizations, 
were able to identify and disrupt the evolving Russian disinformation campaigns. Third, 
the U.S. government was a more active player in securing the elections, primarily through 
its information sharing with the social media companies, political organizations, and the 
American public.  
Despite the best efforts of the Russians, social media companies, news media, and 
research organizations were able to detect, expose, and disrupt the activities of the Internet 
Research Agency and their other online groups, namely Secondary Infektion and the GRU. 
Although America’s private sector may have been caught unaware during the 2016 
elections, it was on heightened alert ahead of 2020, with the noteworthy efforts of CNN, 
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Reuters, and Graphika exposing Russian disinformation activities and paving the way for 
the social media companies to shut down their social media accounts.  
The U.S. government’s response to the Russian influence campaign appeared more 
robust before the 2020 elections than in the 2016 or 2018 elections. These efforts comprised 
a series of transparency and security-related measures. The most important actions taken 
by the U.S. government may have been the information sharing with the social media 
companies to expose Russia’s different operations and shut down its accounts. In addition, 
the U.S. government’s information-sharing may have helped the social media companies 
secure their platforms by identifying malign Russian influence activities. At first glance, 
the U.S. government’s other responses, such as economic sanctions and indictments, may 
not seem impactful because the United States does not have an extradition treaty with 
Russia. As a result, the sanctioned or indicted individuals may never be brought to justice 
in the U.S. court system. However, a critical role of sanctions and indictments is to provide 
transparency, i.e., factual narratives of the crimes perpetrated by Russia that informs the 
American public.  
It took the collaborative efforts of the private sector, in the form of social media 
companies, researcher organizations, and news media, and the public sector, in the form of 
the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government, to turn back the Putin-
sanctioned disinformation operations which were targeting the 2020 U.S. elections. These 
collective actions were viewed through the lens of the Kartapolov Framework to determine 
their effectiveness in countering Russian influence operations. The next chapter will 
identify and examine the most effective countermeasures and provide recommendations 
for safeguarding future elections.   
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO COUNTER 
RUSSIA IN THE FUTURE 
The problem of foreign actors trying to influence the American electorate 
is not going away and, given the current partisan divides in this country, 
may find fertile ground in which to grow in the future. 
― Mark Warner, March 16, 2021 
 
Senator Warner, Chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, made the above 
statement after the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released its report 
appraising foreign threats to the 2020 U.S. elections. This report, backed by the entire U.S. 
Intelligence Community, assessed that Russia was actively trying to influence the elections 
through information operations.377  Furthermore, the report forecasts Russia will continue 
to interfere in future U.S. elections to degrade the United States’ global credibility and 
weaken its influence overseas.378  In anticipation of the continued Russian influence threat, 
this chapter provides a final summation of the American efforts to protect the 2020 
elections and concludes which efforts were the most effective. Based on these conclusions, 
recommendations have been proposed to protect future U.S. elections. These 
recommendations are derived, in part, from proposals by subject matter experts in a variety 
of fields.  
A. CONCLUSIONS – THERE IS NO END GAME 
The major social media companies and the U.S. government’s efforts to protect the 
2020 U.S. elections against Russian malign influence campaigns appeared to be generally 
successful. Using the Kartapolov Framework in this thesis provided a systematic method 
to analyze the effectiveness of the American countermeasures qualitatively. As a reminder, 
the framework is a mental model devised by Thomas Wilhelm, a U.S. Army researcher, to 
understand better the Russian military’s perspective in conducting information operations 
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to further its objectives.379  The most effective measure taken by the major social media 
companies was the rapid detection and takedown of fake accounts and content generated 
by the Internet Research Agency and other Russian proxies. The social media companies’ 
other efficacious efforts included publicizing these account takedowns, which promoted 
transparency to the American public, and partnering with other organizations, such as news 
media and researchers, to expose Russian influence activities which were not on the social 
media platforms. The most effective measure taken by the U.S. government was likely its 
information-sharing efforts with the social media companies to help them identify 
previously unknown Russian influence activities on their platforms. The U.S. 
government’s other effective efforts included its initiative to inculcate good cybersecurity 
practices among the national-level political parties and campaigns and regular public 
messaging about malign influence activities to the American populace.   
The Internet Research Agency resembled a professional marketing firm that 
employed both technology and psychology to maximum effect.380  It took advantage of 
easy-to-use social media platforms to reach millions of U.S. citizens.381  The IRA 
recognized the existing dissension among different sectors of the American population and 
exploited it to drive people further into tribalism.382  Over the past several years, the IRA 
honed its skills and precisely identified specific in-groups it wanted to influence. On the 
right side of the political spectrum, the IRA focused on issues such as illegal immigration, 
gun rights, religious freedom, anti-abortion, and the general fear of change.383  Although 
challenging, if not impossible to quantify, the IRA’s influence activities may have 
reinforced these people’s in-group beliefs, which could have potentially activated them to 
vote for Trump. On the left side of the political spectrum, the IRA appeared to play on the 
fears and frustrations of the more racially and ideologically diverse group to suppress voter 
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turnout.384  The IRA’s main shift in tactics from 2016 to 2020 was its creation of fake 
news outlets appealing to far-right conservatives, in the form of the Newsroom for 
American and European Based Citizens, and ultraliberals, in the form of the PeaceData 
site.385  Ostensibly, the IRA’s rationale for this shift was to control its own content and 
avoid the aggressive disruption tactics of the major social media companies. The IRA’s 
other significant shift was to use indigenous workers in other countries to mask its true 
identity, explicitly creating the front organization known as Eliminating Barriers for the 
Liberation of Africa.386 
The Internet Research Agency’s role in influencing the 2016 and 2020 U.S. 
Presidential Elections may have been marginal but still impactful. That being said, the 
IRA’s influence in 2020 was significantly diminished compared to its efforts in 2016. The 
primary reason was that the IRA’s activities were unnoticed and unconstrained in 2016 but 
were quickly detected and disrupted in 2020 by the major social media companies and the 
U.S. government. One of the IRA’s primary goals was to suppress Black voter turnout.387  
An illustrative statistic was the decline of Black voter turnout in 2016 by seven percent 
compared to the 2012 elections.388  In 2020, Black voter turnout rebounded by four percent 
over the 2016 levels.389  In addition, other minority groups had significant increases in 
voter turnout for 2020. Hispanic voter turnout increased by six percent, and Asian voter 
turnout increased by ten percent.390  These 2020 turnout results showed the ineffectiveness 
of the IRA’s efforts.  
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Many factors are at play when trying to measure the effects of Russia’s influence 
operations. First-order effects include real users interacting with inauthentic content, 
Russian-bot amplification of divisive organic content, and IRA-controlled accounts 
communicating directly with real users. Second-order effects include changes to the social 
network itself by the actions mentioned above and contemporaneous sociopolitical events 
influencing discussions. Due to how the U.S. Electoral College process awards presidential 
electoral votes, the U.S. Presidency was decided by about 78,000 votes combined across 
Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin for 2016.391  In 2020, Biden won the presidency 
by about 45,000 votes combined across Arizona, Georgia, and Wisconsin.392  In both 
presidential elections, voter turnout was near historical highs.393  In order to protect future 
elections in the United States, a whole-of-society approach will be needed to counter 
malign influence from Russia and other adversarial nation-states.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROTECTING FUTURE ELECTIONS 
FROM RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE 
Like the Cold War’s nuclear arms race, the United States may be in a new 
information operations race with Russia. Based on the evaluation of the Russian actions 
and the effectiveness of the American responses, this section makes recommendations for 
protecting future elections that have been drawn from experts in the U.S. government, non-
governmental organizations, and academic institutions. The three types of possible actions 
are broadly categorized as security, transparency, and resiliency measures.394  Social 
media companies and the U.S. government have mainly focused on the first two types of 
measures: security and transparency. Although these measures proved to be successful for 
the 2020 elections and are essential to safeguarding our democracy and the public 
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perception of fair elections, they may not be sufficient for future elections because of the 
current political rancor in the United States. To that end, resiliency measures will be the 
third critical component to promote a flourishing American democracy.  
1. Security Measures 
Security measures serve three purposes: (1) prevention of disinformation or data 
breaches, (2) deterrence of damaging actions or operations, and (3) punishment of criminal 
or other harmful actions.395  These recommendations came from an evaluation of U.S. 
government and private sector actions taken to counter the efforts of the Internet Research 
Agency and other Russian actors. The most impactful measures against the evolving threat 
from Russian information operations were distilled from various U.S. government, non-
governmental organizations, and academic literature. The proposed security measures, 
summarized in Table 10, include enhanced cybersecurity, enhanced disinformation 
detection, economic sanctions, information sharing, and the establishment of a fusion 
center. Items highlighted in yellow are existing measures. Items highlighted in green are 
new proposed measures.  
  
 
395 Bodine-Baron et al., Countering Russian Social Media Influence, 12; U.S. Congress. Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns: Volume 1, 54. 
96 
Table 10. Security Measures for Countering Russian Information Operations. 
Measure Description Responsibility 
Enhanced Cybersecurity Build up cyber expertise and defenses to 
prevent breaches of election infrastructure 
and other government infrastructure.396   
• Government 
• Private Sector 
Enhanced Detection Use advanced technologies, such as artificial 
intelligence, to quickly detect and take down 
disinformation. These technologies can 
augment other types of content 
moderation.397 
• Private Sector 
Economic Sanctions Deter malicious activities and impose costs for 
actors who seek to interfere in U.S. elections 
and the democratic process.398 
• Government 
Information Sharing among 
Government, Social Media 
Companies, and External 
Researchers 
Share threat intelligence among key 
stakeholders to detect, identify, and disrupt 
disinformation campaigns.399 
• Government 
• Private Sector 
• Researchers 
National Counter Information 
Operations Center 
Create an interagency fusion center under the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
to coordinate strategy, intelligence, and 




The first recommendation is for the U.S. government to continue providing 
cybersecurity training and briefings to relevant stakeholders. The Russians did not cause 
any significant data breaches of any national-level political organizations or campaigns for 
 
396 Adapted from O’Connor et al., Cyber-Enabled Foreign Interference, 6; Russian Active Measures 
Campaigns: Volume 1, 55; Report on Russian Active Measures, 121–22. 
397 Adapted from Bodine-Baron et al., Countering Russian Social Media Influence, 12; Cartwright, 
Weir, and Frank, “Fighting Disinformation Warfare with Artificial Intelligence,” 73. 
398 Adapted from Cederberg et al., National Counter-Information Operations Strategy, 11; 
Polyakova, “The Kremlin’s Plot against Democracy.” 
399 Adapted from Cederberg et al., National Counter-Information Operations Strategy, 12; Hanlon, A 
Long Way to Go, 10; O’Connor et al., Cyber-Enabled Foreign Interference, 6. 
400 Adapted from Cederberg et al., National Counter-Information Operations Strategy, 12; Terry L. 
Thompson, “No Silver Bullet: Fighting Russian Disinformation Requires Multiple Actions,” Georgetown 
Journal of International Affairs 21 (2020): 182–94, https://doi.org/10.1353/gia.2020.0033. 
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the 2020 U.S. Elections. Some of this success can be attributed to the cybersecurity training 
and briefings provided to the political organizations and campaigns by the FBI and 
DHS.401  The prevention of data breaches in the future will mean less fodder for the 
Russians or other adversarial governments to incorporate into disinformation campaigns. 
These cybersecurity enhancement actions should continue to be used moving forward as 
technological changes happen rapidly.402   
The second recommendation calls for advanced technologies, including artificial 
intelligence, to be developed and deployed on social media and news platforms to enhance 
the detection, monitoring, and neutralization of covert malign foreign influence 
activities.403  These malign activities may take the form of disinformation content, botnet 
amplifications, or incitement of divisive issues. The neutralization can take the form of 
traditional account takedowns or marking the accounts and content with labels identifying 
their origins and providing access to sources of factual information. Advanced technology 
tools should be developed so platform companies or users may detect disinformation or 
influence activities and crowdsource the appropriate neutralization methods.404  The 
removal of foreign disinformation content can help promote the integrity of American free 
speech and halt the erosion of trust in the electoral process.405  Due to the First Amendment 
(free speech) and Fourth Amendment (privacy) constraints on the U.S. government, 
advanced detection and removal technologies are best employed by private sector 
companies.406   
 
401 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Combating Foreign Influence”; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
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404 Cartwright, Weir, and Frank, “Fighting Disinformation Warfare with Artificial Intelligence,” 73. 
405 Suzanne E. Spaulding and Eric Goldstein, Countering Adversary Threats to Democratic 
Institutions: An Expert Report (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018), 4, 
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The third recommendation is the continued use of economic sanctions by the U.S. 
government. Continued sanctions by the Department of Treasury against Russian 
individuals and entities appeared to have had a significant impact on Russia as a security 
measure. As anecdotal evidence, one of the primary discussion topics at the infamous 
Trump Tower meeting was supposed to be the previously mentioned Magnitsky Act.407  
This act imposed severe financial sanctions on the close allies of Putin and continues to be 
a thorn in his side.408  The sanctions imposed in 2018 may have an add-on effect to the 
Magnitsky Act.409 Economic sanctions should continue to be part of a broad range of tools 
utilized concurrently by the U.S. government for deterrent and punitive effects.410   
The fourth recommendation is the establishment of formal information-sharing 
mechanisms.  Information sharing among different organizations is occurring, but on an ad 
hoc basis, as was seen ahead of the 2020 elections when the FBI shared information with 
the social media companies to help them detect the disinformation campaigns on their 
platforms.411  Information sharing among relevant stakeholders in the malign foreign 
influence space should be formalized and standardized. Appropriate sharing should occur 
between social media companies, those companies and the U.S. government, and 
researchers with the U.S. government and social media companies. The Information 
Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) model has proven successful in different sectors for 
information sharing. One example of this is the Financial Sector ISAC (FS-ISAC).412  
Currently, no Social Media Sector ISAC exists. This gap is likely because of the 
competitive nature of social media companies. Still, the FS-ISAC has shown that financial 
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institutions can set aside rivalries for the common good. The benefit of having an 
information-sharing organization would be to establish norms and best practices for the 
private sector, in addition to sharing threat indicators for mutual benefit. 
The last recommendation is for the U.S. government to establish a National Counter 
Information Operations Center as an interagency fusion center and focal point for 
countering disinformation campaigns.413  The bipartisan U.S. Cyberspace Solarium 
Commission pointed out that the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 
provided a provision wherein the Office of the Director of National Intelligence could form 
a “Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center.”414  This center could be modeled after 
the National Counterterrorism Center, which also operates under the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence. The commission envisioned a center that would allow the relevant 
U.S. government elements to work alongside social media companies to combat 
disinformation.415  In April 2021, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
responded to the new legislation by announcing it was establishing “the Foreign Malign 
Influence Center “in light of evolving threats and in support of growing policy and 
congressional requirements.”416  As of the writing of this thesis, no further details have 
been provided by ODNI, but the announcement appears to be in line with the functionality 
of the center proposed in the 2020 NDAA.  
2. Transparency Measures 
Transparency measures are designed to build trust and confidence in organizations 
by sharing relevant information with the general public.417  The transparency measures 
proposed include a public communications strategy, content labeling standards, updated 
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political advertising and campaign finance laws, and transparency reporting. Table 11 
summarizes the proposed transparency measures to combat Russian disinformation 
campaigns. As with the last table, yellow highlighted items are existing measures, and 
green highlighted items are new proposed measures. 
Table 11. Transparency Measures for Countering Malign Russian Influence. 
Measure Description Responsibility 
Public Communication Strategy Devise and execute a strategy to counter 
disinformation in the public sphere, both 
domestically and overseas, through multiple 
avenues.418 
• Government 
• Private Sector 
Content Labeling Establish and use a standardized method for 
labeling disinformation and misinformation 
on websites and social media platforms.419 
• Private Sector 
Transparency Reporting Provide the public with reports that 
summarize the quantity and type of 
disinformation on a company’s platform. 
These reports should include raw data for 
third parties, such as researchers, to conduct 
detailed analyses.420 
• Private Sector 
• Researchers 
Update Political Advertising 
and Campaign Finance Laws 
Strengthen current statutes to improve 
transparency and prevent foreign entities 
from purchasing advertisements or donating 
to political campaigns.421 
• Government 
 
418 Adapted from Cederberg et al., 11–12; Marcellino et al., Foreign Interference in the 2020 
Election; Polyakova, “The Kremlin’s Plot against Democracy.” 
419 Adapted from Bodine-Baron et al., Countering Russian Social Media Influence, 12; DiResta and 
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First, a public communications strategy would be a whole-of-government plan to 
effectively counter disinformation and propaganda campaigns being waged against the 
American populace.422 An effective strategy would involve providing counter-narratives 
using factual information across various mediums to ensure the public received it, such as 
through news media and social media outlets.423 It would also involve exposing false or 
misleading content and the origins of this information so Americans could understand how 
they were being targeted.424 
Second, the private sector companies should also standardize and expand their use 
of labeling for disinformation, misleading content, and the origins of content.425  This 
change would allow users to decide for themselves how to think about and handle the 
content. As an example, Twitter and Facebook have started labeling misleading tweets and 
posts by government officials.426 The Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA) is the U.S. 
government’s version of what Twitter is doing regarding labeling.427  FARA mandates 
that all agents of foreign governments register with the Department of Justice and ensure 
all of their content in advertising or other messaging is prominently labeled.428  However, 
this statute was enacted in 1938 and could use an update to consider current malign 
influence efforts by Russia and other countries.429  Congress should provide legislative 
fixes to enhance the transparency of foreign involvement with U.S. officials or political 
 
422 Cederberg et al., National Counter-Information Operations Strategy, 11. 
423 Cederberg et al., 11. 
424 Marcellino et al., Foreign Interference in the 2020 Election; Polyakova, “The Kremlin’s Plot 
against Democracy.” 
425 Hanlon, A Long Way to Go, 6. 
426 Facebook, “Facebook - Preventing Election Interference”; Twitter, “Elections Integrity.” 
427 Jessica Brandt and Josh Rudolph, Spies and Money: Legal Defenses Against Foreign Interference 
in Political Campaigns (Washington, DC: Alliance for Security Democracy, German Marshall Fund, 
2021), https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/spies-and-money-legal-defenses-against-foreign-interference-
in-political-campaigns/. 
428 Brandt and Rudolph. 
429 Carolyn Kenney, Max Bergmann, and James Lamond, Understanding and Combating Russian 
and Chinese Influence Operations (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2019), 8, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=822729. 
102 
candidates.430  This addendum includes foreign businesses and consultants who support 
political campaigns, as well as the disclosure of any financial interests a political candidate 
may have overseas.  
Third, transparency reports are the key mechanism for private sector organizations 
to share information with the American public.431  These reports should be expanded to 
include more nuanced details about foreign influence activities detected and thwarted on 
social media platforms. All social media companies should also make public their entire 
archives of malign covert influence content that was taken down.432  These archives will 
enable general users, as well as researchers and non-governmental organizations, to 
analyze the data and provide reports to the American populace. The relationship between 
the companies and the researchers can help the companies build capacity to analyze malign 
foreign influence efforts and earn public trust from engaging with independent researchers. 
Last, both political advertising and campaign finance laws should be strengthened 
by closing loopholes to identify the buyers and donors more quickly while also considering 
the exponential growth of online platforms for advertising and fundraising.433  Current 
technology advancements have allowed foreign entities to anonymize or obscure their 
identities and origins. The House Intelligence Committee noted loopholes in current 
campaign finance laws that allow foreign entities to provide services to political 
campaigns.434  Improved political advertising and campaign finance laws will allow the 
American public to make informed decisions during the elections.  
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3. Resiliency Measures 
The last but perhaps most crucial measure for consideration is resiliency. The 2021 
Intelligence Community’s annual threat assessment named Russia as one of “the most 
serious intelligence threats to the United States” and warned that the Russian government 
would continue its efforts to propagate dissension in the American populace.435  In 
combating future Russian influence campaigns, the two relevant facets of resiliency are 
improved media literacy and critical thinking for the American public.436   
Improved media literacy requires both educational and technological components. 
One study showed that media literacy education for adolescents had “more to do with 
promoting an understanding of media content and production, rather than simply forming 
habits of consumption.”437  The government, news media, and social media companies all 
need to play a role in helping both children and adults understand media content origination 
and generation.438  The solutions include public service announcements that are informed 
by media literacy experts, education programs for school-aged children, and career 
development or continuing education programs for adults.439    
Technological enhancements are also needed to improve media literacy. In our 
current digital age, Americans are awash with overwhelming amounts of information, 
much of which is false or misleading. A recent study showed that exposure to inaccurate 
or misleading information on Facebook might slow down or stop users’ knowledge 
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acquisition.440  All of this content, if made by Americans, is considered free speech. A 
thornier issue is the artificial amplification of American free speech by Russia or other 
foreign actors through social media botnets.441  Artificial intelligence and other advanced 
technologies will be needed to detect and take down the Russian-controlled bots generating 
or amplifying malicious content while distinguishing it from First Amendment protected 
American speech.442   
One of the essential skills needed for each American is critical thinking, i.e., the 
ability to discern fact from fiction to make informed conclusions and decisions.443 
Although the focus of this thesis was Russian disinformation campaigns, domestic 
disinformation operations also featured prominently ahead of the 2020 elections.444  
Critical thinking is an important measure that can be used to examine information despite 
its origin and is already being taught to some degree as a part of different school subjects 
such as language arts, mathematics, and social studies. A vital part of a good school 
curriculum should teach students how to be critical and discerning in their digital media 
consumption as references and sources for their other coursework.445   
Furthermore, Americans can learn from other democracies targeted by Russian 
propaganda. Even with the unrelenting assault of Russian information operations, the 
democracies in former Soviet Bloc countries appear to have relatively informed and 
resilient electorates because media literacy and critical thinking are indoctrinated into their 
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entire education and news media ecosystem.446  European media platforms do not feature 
standardized labeling of disinformation or state-sponsored content. Though these Eastern 
European countries do not have the economic or technological advantages of the United 
States, they seem to be inoculated from the effects of Russian disinformation operations.447  
Improved media literacy and critical thinking will help Americans discern what they are 
reading to make better-informed decisions regarding elections and other vital issues.448 
During his farewell speech after serving a second term in office, George 
Washington stated, “Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence...the jealousy of a free 
people ought to be constantly awake, since history and experience prove that foreign 
influence is one of the most baneful foes of republic government.”449  Those words seem 
prescient today, well over two hundred years later. Except for an interlude from the end of 
the Cold War in 1991 to 2014, Russia has waged a campaign of information warfare to tear 
the fabric of Western democracy through wide-ranging operations on social media 
platforms targeting Americans.450  Both the U.S. government and major social media 
companies were caught flatfooted in 2016 but took a series of security and transparency 
actions since then to counter the ongoing Russian efforts targeting U.S. elections 
specifically and American democracy more broadly. Hopefully, incorporating the existing 
and proposed measures will help repair and strengthen the framework of American 
democracy for the 21st century. 
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